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Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
which forbids age-based discrimination against state 
and local government employees, preclude those 
employees from bringing a section 1983 action to 
redress age discrimination that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause? 
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Petitioner Anthony Hildebrand respectfully prays 
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals entered on June 27, 2014. 
--------·--------
OPINIONS BELOW 
The June 27, 2014 opinion of the court of appeals, 
which is reported at 757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014), is set 
out at pp. la-32a of the Appendix. The January 4, 
2013 opinion of the district court, which is not official-
ly reported, is set out at pp. 33a-54a of the Appendix. 
The December 7, 2012 opinion of the district court, 
which is unofficially reported at 2012 WL 6093798 
(Dec. 7, 2012), is set out at pp. 57a-80a of the Appendix. 
--------·--------
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered 
on June 27, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
--------·--------
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED 
The statutory provisions and constitutional 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case presents the issue which the Court 
granted certiorari to decide in Madigan v. Levin, 
No. 12-872, cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2 (2013): 
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
precludes section 1983 actions alleging age-based 
discrimination that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Anthony Hildebrand was employed as a detective 
for the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office 
("DA's Office") for five years before he was terminated 
in early 2011. Prior to his work at the DA's Office, 
Hildebrand spent fifteen years as an undercover 
narcotics detective with the Pittsburgh Police De-
partment. 
Hildebrand alleges that for several years before 
his dismissal he was subject to a campaign of har-
assment by officials in the DA's Office. Officials re-
peatedly described Hildebrand as an "old man" or "old 
mother f**ker," commented on his "gray old man beard," 
"ugly old ass," and "senility," taunted him as having 
Alzheimer's disease, and referred to Hildebrand and 
others of the same age as "old sons of. bitches." One 
official commented, "'[Y]ou old guys just don't under-
stand English. Can't your old decrepit mind understand 
plain English?"' One Assistant District Attorney 
posted on a public bulletin board near Hildebrand's 
work area a photograph "of a very old man with a 
beard smoking crack cocaine," labeling the old man 
with Hildebrand's name. Hildebrand was given far 
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more work than younger detectives, but at times was 
relegated to demeaning tasks and a smaller work 
area without a desk, phone or computer. He was 
given a dangerously defective car, described by one 
official as an "old car for an old man." Ultimately 
Hildebrand was threatened with baseless criminal 
charges. When Hildebrand did not resign, he was 
dismissed. Complaint, pp. 4-21. 
Hildebrand filed a charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC and Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission. The charge asserted that because of his 
age he had been "subjected ... to a hostile work envi-
ronment" and discharged. Following receipt of a 
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Hildebrand com-
menced this action in federal district court, alleging 
that he had been repeatedly harassed and finally 
dismissed because of his age. The complaint asserted 
a number of different legal claims, including an 
allegation that this discrimination violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (" ADEA''), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and a contention that the discrim-
ination violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint, p. 24. The com-
plaint sough~ to enforce that constitutional claim 
through the private cause of action provided by 
section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim.1 With regard to Hildebrand's 
1 The district court initially dismissed the complaint in 
December 2012. App. 57a-80a. Hildebrand filed an amended 
(Continued on following page) 
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ADEA claim, the court held that the complaint was 
insufficient because, although it contained a general 
allegation that Hildebrand had filed a timely charge 
and brought suit within 90 days of the right-to-sue 
letter, the complaint lacked a specific allegation as to 
the dates of that charge and letter. App. 36a-44a, 61a-
62a (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). 
The district court dismissed the section 1983 claim on 
the ground that the complaint lacked sufficiently 
specific allegations of a custom or policy of unconsti-
tutional action. App. 48a-53a, 67a-71a; see Monell u. 
Dept. of Soc. Sues. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978). 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reinstated the ADEA 
claim against the Allegheny County District Attor-
ney's Office, although not against Allegheny County. 
App. 25a-30a. With regard to Hildebrand's section 
1983 action, the Third Circuit held that the ADEA 
precludes any section 1983 action based on a claim 
that age-based discrimination violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, and on that ground affirmed the 
dismissal of the section 1983 claim. App. 8a-22a. The 
Third Circuit acknowledged that there is a. circuit 
conflict on this issue, and expressly disagreed with 
the contrary holding of the Seventh Circuit in Levin 
complaint, which the court dismissed in January, 2013. App. 
33a-54a. 
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v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S.Ct. 1600 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2 
(2013). 
-------·--------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
In March 2013 this Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether the ADEA precludes a section 1983 
claim of unconstitutional age-based discrimination. 
Madigan v. Levin, 133 S.Ct. 1600 (2013). There was 
an insolvable vehicle problem in Madigan, and the 
petition was dismissed as improvidently granted. 134 
S.Ct. 2 (2013). This case presents the same question, 
and provides an ideal vehicle for resolving it. 
I. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT 
CONFLICT REGARDING WHETHER THE 
ADEA PRECLUDES A SECTION 1983 AC-
TION TO REDRESS UNCONSTITUTION-
AL AGE-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
This Court granted certiorari in Madigan v. 
Levin to resolve the circuit conflict regarding whether 
the ADEA precludes a section 1983 claim of unconsti-
tutional age-based discrimination. See Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Madigan v. Levin, 7-10, available 
at 2013 WL 166411. The Third Circuit decision in this 
case, expressly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit 
decision in Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 
2012), further entrenching and compounding that 
conflict. 
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The Seventh Circuit in Levin concluded, contrary 
to the decision of the Third Circuit in the instant 
case, that the ADEA does not preclude section 1983 
age-based equal protection claims. 692 F.3d at 611-22. 
The Seventh Circuit insisted that the standard gov-
erning preclusion of a section 1983 constitutional 
claim is more demanding than the standard govern-
ing cases in which a plaintiff seeks to use the section 
1983 private cause of action to enforce a statutory 
right. 692 F.3d at 611-15. The ADEA did not preclude 
section 1983 equal protection claims, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned, because the ADEA was not enacted 
for the purpose of enforcing constitutional rights. 
In [Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 75 (1972) 
and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)], 
the statutes at issue were specifically de-
signed to address constitutional issues .... The 
ADEA is readily distinguishable. "In contrast 
to the statutes at issue in Preiser and in 
Smith, the ADEA does not purport to provide 
a remedy for violation of constitutional 
rights. Instead it provides a mechanism to 
enforce only the substantive rights created 
by the ADEA itself." Zombro [v. Baltimore 
City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364,] 1371 [(4th 
Cir. 1989)] (Murnaghan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
692 F.3d at 618-19. In addition, the Seventh Circuit 
held that preclusion was inappropriate because the 
rights and protections afforded by the ADEA are 
different from those that would exist in a section 1983 
equal protection case. "[T]he right and protections 
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afforded by the ADEA and § 1983 equal protection 
claims diverge in a few significant ways." 692 F.3d at 
621. Moreover, it explained, the ADEA did not author-
ize civil actions against certain categories of defen-
dants who could be sued in a section 1983 case. Id. 
The Third Circuit in this case expressly disa-
greed with the reasoning and conclusion of the Sev-
enth Circuit in Levin. The court below rejected the 
Seventh Circuit's view that the ADEA could not 
preclude section 1983 equal protection claims unless 
Congress adopted the ADEA for the purpose of enforc-
ing the constitutional right against age discrimina-
tion. The Third Circuit thought it sufficient that the 
ADEA forbids at least some discriminatory practices 
that would also violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
even if Congress did not adopt the ADEA for that 
purpose. App. 21a. The Third Circuit rejected the 
Seventh Circuit's objection that the ADEA provides 
no protection at all for a significant numbers of 
excluded individuals and types of age discrimination 
claims, and contains no remedies at all for other 
types of age-discrimination equal protection viola-
tions. According to the Third Circuit, the denial of 
any relief for those categories of potential constitu-
tional violations confirmed - rather than undermined 
-its conclusion that the ADEA precludes all section 
1983 equal protection claims. App. 22a. In addition, 
the court of appeals below explained that it "cannot 
agree with Levin that Congress must provide some 
'additional indication' of its intent" beyond creating 
an administrative and judicial enforcement scheme 
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for the statutory rights that are created by the ADEA. 
App. 19a (quoting Levin, 692 F.3d at 619). 
The Seventh Circuit decision in Levin was itself 
avowedly contrary to earlier decisions in several 
other circuits. 692 F.3d at 616. In Zombro v. Balti-
more City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989), 
the Fourth Circuit applied a general rule that statu-
tory schemes are presumed to preempt section 1983 
actions, unless there is a clear showing that Congress 
intended to preserve such ·section 1983 actions, 
applying the same rule regardless of whether the 
section 1983 action in question was to enforce that 
statute or to enforce the constitution. 
[T]he general policy of precluding § 1983 
suits, where Congress has enacted a compre-
hensive statute specifically designed to re-
dress grievances alleged by the plaintiff, is 
as applicable in instances such as the case at 
bar as cases where a constitutional claim is 
attached to a statutory claim brought under 
§ 1983. We hold that this policy should be fol-
lowed unless the legislative history of the 
comprehensive statutory scheme in question 
manifests a congressional intent to allow an 
individual to pursue independently rights 
under both the comprehensive statutory 
scheme and other applicable state and feder-
al statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We find 
no such intent in the language and history of 
theADEA. 
868 F.2d at 1368-69. In Lafleur v. Texas Dep't of 
Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth 
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Circuit reasoned that the fact that the ADEA "cov-
ered" age discrimination was sufficient to preclude 
any section 1983 age-based equal protection claim. 
[W]here Congress has enacted a statute that 
covers a specific substantive area providing 
specific remedies, a cause of action under 
§ 1983 is foreclosed.... [B]ecause Congress 
has enacted a statutory provision to confront 
age discrimination in the work place via the 
ADEA, ... Lefleur's § 1983 age discrimination 
claim is preempted by the AD EA. 
The Tenth Circuit subsequently adopted the holding 
in Lafleur. Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 
(lOth Cir. 1998) ("For numerous, well-founded rea-
sons ... the ... Fifth Circuit[] ha[s] concluded that age 
discrimination claims brought under § 1983 are 
preempted by the ADEA. See LaFleur .... We ... adopt 
the holding and rationale of LaFleur ... as the law of 
this circuit.. .. "). Later the Ninth Circuit also held that 
the ADEA bars such section 1983 equal protection 
claims. Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Educa-
tion, 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Congress 
intended the ADEA to serve as the exclusive means 
for pursuing claims of age discrimination in employ-
ment. Therefore, the preclusion of § 1983 claims in 
this context is required."); see Cummins v. City of 
Yuma, Arizona, 410 Fed.Appx. 72, 73 (9th Cir. 2011) 
("the ADEA is plaintiff's exclusive remedy. As a 
matter of law, plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 equal 
protection claim for age discrimination in employ-
ment."). The First and Fourth Circuits have applied 
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this majority rule to constitutional claims by federal 
employees.2 Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 
(1st Cir. 2003); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.3d 
315, 318 (D.C.Cir. 1991). 
The existence of this circuit split is deeply en-
trenched and widely acknowledged. The court of 
appeals below recognized this circuit conflict. "[A] 
number of our sister Courts of Appeals have held that 
the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims of age discrimina-
tion .... The Seventh Circuit ... , however, reached the 
opposite conclusion." App. 15a; see id. at 16a ("the 
Seventh Circuit diverged from this consensus view."). 
"Contrary to Levin, ... we conclude that ... the rele-
vant considerations weigh in favor of finding that the 
ADEA does indeed bar such § 1983 claims." App. 18a. 
The Third Circuit explained that it "cannot agree 
with Levin" that the mere existence of a comprehen-
sive remedial scheme in the ADEA is insufficient 
without more to demonstrate that the ADEA pre-
cludes section 1983 actions. App. 19a. "Although, as 
the Levin court emphasizes, the potential defendants 
are different under the ADEA and § 1983, we do not 
believe this distinction significant enough to demon-
strate congressional intent to permit both claims." 
App. 21a-22a. 
2 An equal protection claim by federal employees would rest 
on the private cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). The cause of action provided by section 1983 is limited to 
discrimination that occurs under color of state law, and thus 
applies only to state and local government employees. 
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In its brief in the court of appeals, Allegheny 
County noted that the Seventh Circuit decision in 
Levin was contrary to decisions in the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Brief of Allegheny 
County, 19 n.3, available at 2013 WL 2951781. Since 
the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin, a number of 
district courts have recognized the circuit split. 
Edwards v. Borough of Dickson City, 994 F.Supp.2d 
616, 622 (M.D.Pa. 2014) (contrasting the majority 
view with "the minority position taken by the Sev-
enth Circuit"); Collins v. Fulton County School Dist., 
2012 WL 7802745 at *24 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 26, 2013) 
("the Seventh Circuit has split from the majority 
rule .... "); McCampbell v. Bishop State Community 
College, 2013 WL 5979752 at *3 (S.D.Ala. Nov. 12, 
2013) (noting "the emergent circuit split"). 
The importance of this issue is attested to by the 
amicus briefs that were filed at the certiorari stage in 
Madigan. Twelve states submitted a brief urging the 
Court to "intervene to end the conflict among the 
circuits." Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and 
Eleven Other States in Support of Petitioners, 3, 
available at 2013 WL 648688. That brief correctly 
noted that "whether a state or municipality may be 
subjected to suit under both the ADEA and § 1983 
depends entirely on its location." ld. at 4. The Inter-
national Municipal Lawyers Association also filed a 
brief urging this Court to grant review. Brief for 
International Municipal Lawyers Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, available at 2013 
WL648687. 
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As the state petitioner in Madigan correctly 
pointed out, "the question whether the ADEA pre-
cludes § 1983 employment discrimination claims 
arises regularly, and the federal courts are intracta-
bly divided. Only this Court can impose national 
uniformity on this recurring question." Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, 10. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STAN-
DARDS IN SMITH V. ROBINSON AND 
FITZGERALD V. BARNSTABLE SCHOOL 
COMMITTEE 
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), and 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 
(2009), establish the standards governing when a 
statute precludes a section 1983 action to enforce a 
related constitutional right. First, the statute must 
have been enacted for the purpose of enforcing that 
specific constitutional right. Second-, Congress must 
have intended that the statute be the "sole" and 
"exclusive" method of enforcing the constitutional 
right in question.3 Neither of those standards are 
3 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 24 7 (burden on the defendant is to 
show that Congress__ saw Title IX, Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, as "the sole means of vindicating the 
constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination per-
petrated by educational institutions"); Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009 
(issue is whether "Congress intended that the [statute] be the 
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert those 
[constitutional] claims."). 
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satisfied in this case. The Third Circuit did not pur-
port to hold that these standards had been met, but 
instead mistakenly rested its decision largely on the 
fact that the ADEA creates an administrative and 
judicial remedy for enforcing the statutory rights 
created by that law. 
(1) The first element of the Smith/Fitzgerald 
test is a demonstration that in enacting a given 
statute, Congress intended the legislation, not merely 
to enforce the rights established by the statute itself, 
but also to provide a remedy for a constitutional 
right. In Smith that showing was made in several 
ways. The statute there at issue, the Education of the 
Handicapped Act ("EHA"), itself expressly stated that 
one purpose of the legislation was to protect the equal 
protection rights of handicapped children. Section 3 
of the EHA explained that the legislation was enacted 
"to assist State and local efforts to provide pro-
grams to meet the educational needs of handicapped 
children in- order to assure equal protection of the 
law."4 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6). The legislative history 
of the EHA specifically emphasized the need to as-
sure that handicapped children have the access to 
an appropriate public education that several courts 
had held was guaranteed by the Equal Protection 
• In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), there was 
similar textual evidence that Congress intended to provide a 
remedy for constitutional violations when it adopted the habeas 
corpus act. 411 U.S. at 483 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). 
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Clause. 468 U.S. at 1010. The Senate Report ex-
pressly detailed the intent of Congress to provide a 
remedial mechanism to enforce the constitutional 
rights of handicapped children. S.Rep. 94-168, p. 9 
(1975). And the EHA applied to the very individuals-
handicapped children in public schools - whose con-
stitutional rights were at stake. See Smith, 468 U.S. 
at 1009 ("petitioner's constitutional claims ... are 
virtually identical to their EHA claims."). 
In Fitzgerald, on the other hand, there was no 
showing that Congress had enacted the statute in 
question- Title IX- to provide redress for any identi-
fied constitutional problem. The text of Title IX 
contains no reference to equal protection or any other 
constitutional right. Because there was a lack of 
congruity between the schools and practices covered 
by Title IX, and the schools and practices subject to 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court concluded it 
was unlikely that Congress intended Title IX to be a 
remedy - least of all an exclusive remedy --for equal 
protection violations. "In cases in which the § 1983 
claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of con-
gressional intent may be inferred from a comparison 
of the rights and protections of the statute and those 
existing under the Constitution. Where the contours 
of such rights and protections diverge in significant 
ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to dis-
place § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights." 
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-53. "A comparison of the 
substantive rights and protections under Title IX and 
under the Equal Protection Clause lends further 
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support to the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend Title IX to preclude§ 1983 constitutional suits. 
Title IX's protections are narrower in some respects 
and broader in others. Because the protections guar-
anteed by the two sources of law diverge in this way, 
we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that 
'Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicat-
ing the constitutional right.. .. '" 555 U.S. at 256.5 
The question in the instant case is whether the 
ADEA forbade age-based discrimination against state 
and local government employees for the purpose of 
protecting the constitutional right of those workers to 
be free from irrational age-based discrimination.6 
This Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), forecloses any possibility 
of meeting this standard. "Judged against the back-
drop of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence, it 
is clear that the ADEA ... ' ... cannot be understood as 
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional 
5 This Court made a similar point when explaining why 
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., does 
not preclude utilization of the pre-existing rights in section 1981 
to remedy racial discrimination in employment. "Section 1981 
_ is not coextensive in its coverage with Title VII. The latter is 
made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)." 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 
(1975). 
6 As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA did not apply to 
government employees. It was amended in 1974 to cover those 
workers. 
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behavior.'" Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
at 83-84 (2000) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). The problems which the ADEA 
addressed were usually not constitutional in nature. 
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrim-
ination by the States, much less any discrimination 
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional 
violation.'' 528 U.S. at 89. 
In addition, the prohibitions enacted by the 
ADEA have little correlation with potential constitu-
tional violations. On the one hand, most of the gov-
ernment employment practices forbidden by the 
ADEA would not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
"The [ADEA] through its broad restriction on the use 
of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substan-
tially more state employment decisions and practices 
than would likely be held unconstitutional under the 
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.'' 
Kimel u. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 86. To the 
extent that some employment decisions forbidden by 
the ADEA also happen to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, that is an entirely incidental effect of legisla-
tion that was not adopted for the purpose of enforcing 
constitutional rights. On the other hand, the ADEA 
is limited in a manner which necessarily excludes 
many government employees and possible constitu-
tional violations claims. 
The Third Circuit did not hold or suggest that the 
ADEA, like the EHA, was enacted for the purpose of 
enforcing constitutional rights. To the contrary, it 
stated only that "[b]y prohibiting 'arbitrary age dis-
crimination,' the ADEA encompasses the protections 
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afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment .... " App. 21a. 
That comment is only an observation that there is a 
limited degree of overlap between the prohibitions of 
the ADEA and the guarantees of the Equal Protection 
Clause, not a claim that Congress applied the ADEA 
to state and local government employees for the 
purpose of enforcing that constitutional right. 
(2) Second, there must be a showing that Con-
gress intended that the statutory scheme in question 
be the exclusive remedy for the constitutional right. 
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252 ("exclusive avenue"), 256 
("sole means"). Such a demonstration is necessary to 
meet a defendant's burden of proving that the statu-
tory scheme was intended to supplant, rather than 
merely supplement, enforcement of that constitution-
al right under section 1983. 
Congress often adopts a series of overlapping 
statutes and remedial schemes to deal with a single 
problem. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 48 (1974), the Court noted that "Title VII was 
designed to supplement rather than supplant, exist-
ing laws and institutions relating to employment 
discrimination." Where Congress creates supplemen-
tary provisions to address a particular problem, those 
provisions will ordinarily have different remedies or 
procedural schemes. Such differences alone cannot 
demonstrate that one provision was intended to pre-
clude use of the other; Congress may simply have 
intended to provide several tools for addressing a 
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difficult problem. 7 Thus the mere fact that a statute 
was adopted to provide a remedy for a constitutional 
violation does not, without more, establish that the 
law was intended to be the only such remedy, displac-
ing section 1983 actions or any other pre-existing 
right or remedy. 
Smith concluded that this standard had been met 
in that case because "[t]he legislative history [of the 
EHA] ... indicates that Congress perceived the ERA 
as the most effective vehicle for protecting the consti-
tutional right of a handicapped child to a public 
education." 468 U.S. at 1012-13 (emphasis added). 
The comprehensive scheme established by the ERA 
had been described in detail in Board of Education of 
Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176 (1984). Under the EHA, an "individualized 
educational program," containing a number of re-
quired features, must be developed to meet the needs 
of each child, through a highly structured process 
mandated by the statute. The Court in Smith con-
cluded that the EHA precluded section 1983 actions 
because Congress had determined that the elaborate 
system of rights and procedures established by the 
EHA was "the most effective means" for enforcing the 
-
7 See Johnson u. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 
461 ("Congress has made available to the claimant ... independ-
ent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a 
valuable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative 
route may be highly preferred over the litigatory; under others 
the reverse may be true."). 
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constitutional rights of handicapped children, specifi-
cally a more effective means of doing so than lawsuits 
to enforce those constitutional rights. 468 U.S. at 
1011-12. "No federal district court presented with a 
constitutional claim to a public education can dupli-
cate that process." I d. 8 It was on that basis that 
Smith concluded that "Congress intended the EHA to 
be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may 
assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed 
education .... " 468 U.S. at 1009 (emphasis added). 
On the other hand, Fitzgerald explained that a 
"lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a 
comparison of the rights and protections of the stat-
ute and those existing under the Constitution. Where 
the contours of such rights and protections diverge 
in significant ways, it is not likely that Congress in-
tended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitu-
tional rights." Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-53 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). Fitzgerald 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended that 
Title IX be the exclusive remedy for gender-based 
discrimination in education because Title IX itself did 
not apply to all institutions subject to the commands 
of the Equal Protection Clause or to all constitutional 
claims that might arise at covered institutions. 555 
U.S. at 257-58. 
8 
"The very importance which Congress has attached to 
compliance with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP 
would be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state 
decisions at nought." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 
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As the Seventh Circuit noted in Levin, the ADEA 
like Title IX is expressly inapplicable to significant 
categories of public employees and to certain identifi-
able types of unconstitutional discrimination. "[T]he 
ADEA expressly limits or exempts claims by certain 
individuals, including elected officials and certain 
members of their staff, appointees, law enforcement 
officers, and firefighters. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 
630(f) .... The statutory scheme also prohibits claims 
by employees under the age of forty or those bringing 
so-called 'reverse age discrimination' claims. See Gen. 
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 
(2004) .... There are no such limitations for § 1983 
equal protection claims." Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 
at 621.9 In addition, the ADEA provides no remedies 
at all for certain types of age-based discrimination. Of 
particular importance here, because the ADEA does 
not authorize compensatory damages, there would 
ordinarily be no statutory remedy for age-based 
harassment, 10 one of the very claims in this case. The 
ADEA cannot possibly be the "exclusive remedy" for 
age-based discrimination against workers under 40, 
for discrimination against workers because of their 
9 E.g., McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F.Supp. 1114, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (statute law forbidding hiring of any person over the age 
of 29 as a police officer "bears no rational relationship to any 
legitimate state purpose and is violative of the equal protection 
of the law."). 
10 See Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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youth, or for age-based harassment, because it pro-
vides no remedy at all for such discrimination. 11 
The Third Circuit "th[ought] that the fact that 
certain government employees are either exempted 
from the ADEA, or limited to certain remedies, ... 
demonstrates congressional intent to specifically 
define the rights of those employees rather than to 
permit such employees to circumvent these limita-
tions by filing directly under § 1983." App. 22a. On 
this view, the intent of Congress in adopting the 
ADEA was not to enforce the rights guaranteed by 
the Equal Protection Clause, but instead to bar 
enforcement of some of those rights by "defin[ing]" 
them out of the ADEA. This is the very opposite of the 
standard established by Fitzgerald and Smith. Under 
those decisions, the exclusion from a statutory scheme 
of an identifiable subset of constitutional rights 
demonstrates that Congress did not intend the stat-
ute to be the exclusive method of enforcing that right, 
not that Congress was attempting to "define" away 
and obstruct enforcement of those rights. 
(3) The linchpin of the Third Circuit's opm10n 
wa_s its insistence that the existence of a comprehen-
sive remedial scheme in ADEA is sufficient, without 
11 This problem is highlighted by the comment in Ahlmeyer 
v. Nevada System of Higher Education, that "[ w ]e are unable to 
perceive ... a constitutional claim for age discrimination that is 
not vindicated fully by the ADEA." 555 F.3d at 1058. In fact, as 
the Seventh Circuit emphasized in Levin, there are many such 
claims. 
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more, to preclude any section 1983 age discrimination 
claim. The court emphasized that the ADEA requires 
an employee to file an administrative charge with the 
EEOC prior to filing suit, and directs the EEOC to 
seek to conciliate such discrimination charges. App. 
20a. "In light of these requirements, we agree with 
the majority of our sister Courts of Appeals that this 
scheme would be undermined if plaintiffs could sue 
directly under § 1983." App. 20a-21a. 
If that aspect of the ADEA is sufficient to bar 
section 1983 actions for age-based discrimination, 
however, the similar remedial provisions of Title VII 
would also bar section 1983 actions for race-based 
discrimination. The ADEA remedial scheme is largely 
modeled on the provisions of the earlier-enacted Title 
VII charge process; significant portions of the lan-
guage of the ADEA are taken essentially verbatim 
from the provisions of Title VII. The direction in 
sections 626(b) and 626(d)(1) of the ADEA that the 
EEOC seek "to eliminate" any unlawful practice 
"through informal methods of conciliation, conference, 
and persuasion" is lifted, verbatim, from section 
706(b) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Section 
626(d)(1) of the ADEA establishes three possible 
deadlines for a charge: within 180 days after the 
alleged unlawful practice occurred, within 300 days of 
such an occurrence in a state with its own anti-
discrimination law, or within 30 days after receipt of 
notice of the termination of such state proceedings. 
These are the identical deadlines earlier provided in 
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section 706(e) of Title VII, and much of the wording is 
the same. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
But this Court has repeatedly held that Title VII 
does not bar those employees from bringing a section 
1983 action under the Equal Protection Clause to 
redress employment discrimination on the basis of 
race. That well-established interpretation of Title VII 
is largely dispositive of the dispute regarding the ef-
fect of the ADEA on section 1983 actions. In a series 
of decisions over a period of four decades, this Court 
has repeatedly held that Title VII does not preclude 
either section 1983 equal protection claims or claims 
under other federal anti-discrimination statutes. That 
rule applies not only to state and local government 
workers, but also to employees of private employers, 
who may - in addition to claims under Title VII -
assert claims under section 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
Shortly before the ADEA was amended in 1974 to 
apply to state and local government employees, the 
Court pointed out in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
that "legislative enactments in this area have long 
evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlap-
ping remedies against discrimination." 415 U.S. at 
4 7. Alexander cited as examples of that congressional 
practice "42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) 
[and] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871)." 415 
U.S. at 47 n.7. "Title VII was designed to supplement 
rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions 
relating to employment discrimination." 415 U.S. at 
48-49. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
U.S. 454, 459 (1975), reiterated that interpretation of 
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Title VII. Johnson explained that under this well-
established body of law, "[ w ]here conduct is covered 
by both section 1981 and Title VII, ... a plaintiff is 
free to pursue a claim by bringing suit under § 1981 
without resort to th[e] [Title VII] statutory prerequi-
sites." North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 
(1982), held that Title VII does not preclude claims 
under Title IX asserting gender-based discrimination 
in employment. "[T]he school boards insist that the 
victims of employment discrimination have remedies 
other than those available under Title IX .... [E]ven if 
alternative remedies are available ... this Court 
repeatedly has recognized that Congress has provided 
a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to eradi-
cate employment discrimination." 456 U.S. at 535 n.26. 
"Despite Title VII's range and its design as a compre-
hensive solution for the problem of invidious discrim-
ination in employment, the aggrieved individual 
clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses 
and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief." 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 
(1989). In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 
442 (2008), the defendant objected that if section 1981 
were interpreted to encompass retaliation claims, 
plaintiffs able to file suit under section ·1981 could 
skip the exhaustion requirements in Title VII, and 
would be able to obtain remedies greater than those 
authorized by Title VII. This Court rejected that 
contention as inconsistent with the long-recognized 
intent of Congress to accord to discrimination victims 
access to several distinct and overlapping remedies. 
"Precisely the same kind of Title VIII§ 1981 'overlap' 
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and potential circumvention exists in respect to 
employment-related direct discrimination. Yet Con-
gress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct 
employment discrimination .... In a word, we have 
previously held that the 'overlap' reflects congres-
sional design .... We have no reason to reach a differ-
ent conclusion in this case." 553 U.S. at 454-55. 
There is no reason to believe that Congress, 
having determined that Title VII should supplement, 
rather than supplant, other remedies for discrimina-
tion, claims, would have intended the ADEA to func-
tion in a different manner. Title VII and the ADEA 
are parts of a single overall national policy to eradi-
cate bias in the workplace. "The ADEA [was] enacted 
in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional effort to 
eradicate discrimination in the workplace.... The 
ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to 
protect employees in the workplace nationwide. See 
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
et seq., ... (race, color, sex, national origin, and reli-
gion); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . ... (disability); .... ; the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (sex)." McKennon 
v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 
(1995). The existence of independent, overlapping 
remedies has for decades been a hallmark of that 
congressional scheme. The national policy to prevent 
and correct age discrimination in employment, like 
the similar policy regarding discrimination on the 
basis of race, deliberately involves a range of overlap-
ping prohibitions and remedies. 
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III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT 
VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE QUES-
TION PRESENTED 
This case provides an excellent vehicle for resolv-
ing the question presented. The Third Circuit dis-
missed Hildebrand's section 1983 constitutional claim 
expressly, and solely, based on its view that the ADEA 
bars section 1983 claims for age-based equal protec-
tion violations. The Third Circuit decision, although 
incorrect, presents a significantly more detailed 
analysis than previous decisions adopting the majori-
. ty view. As a result, the issues raised by the question 
presented have now been more thoroughly aired in 
the lower courts than was true when this Court 
granted certiorari in Madigan v. Levin. 
--------·--------
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ERIC SCHNAPPER* 
School of Law 
University ofWashington 
P.O. Box 353020 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal presents three issues on which we 
have not previously ruled in a precedential opinion. 
First, whether an employee terminated from a local 
government position may maintain an action for age 
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, 
whether the pleading of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (" ADEA''), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, must satisfy the standards 
established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). And third, whether a complain-
ant's submission of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's revised Intake Questionnaire 
constitutes the filing of a charge of discrimination. 
As to the first question, we hold that a state or 
local government employee may not maintain an age 
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but 
must instead proceed under the ADEA. As to the 
second question, we hold that a plaintiff is not obli-
gated to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies 
with particularity, but may instead allege in general 
terms that the required administrative process has 
been completed. And finally, we hold that the EEOC 
Intake Questionnaire, revised in the wake of Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 128 S.Ct. 
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1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008), when properly complet-
ed, constitutes a charge of discrimination. 
As a result of our holdings, we will affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of Appellant Anthony 
Hildebrand's § 1983 claims but we will vacate the 
District Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA claim 
against the Allegheny County District Attorney's 
Office as Hildebrand submitted a properly completed 
Intake Questionnaire to the EEOC within the dead-
line for filing a charge of discrimination, and Hilde-
brand adequately pled the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. Finally, we will affirm the 
dismissal of the ADEA claims against Appellee Alle-
gheny County because it was not named on the 
Intake Questionnaire, and was not identified as a 
respondent to an age discrimination charge until 
after the deadline for filing a charge of discrimination 
against it had passed. 
I. Background 
Anthony Hildebrand was employed as a detective 
for the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office 
("DA's Office") for five years before he was terminated 
on February 18, 2011. Prior to his work at the DA's 
Office, Hildebrand spent fifteen years as an under-
cover narcotics detective with the Pittsburgh Police 
Department. 
On February 18, 2011, Hildebrand received a 
letter suspending him without pay for five days 
pending discharge, and announcing his termination 
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effective that day. He filed an internal grievance, but 
the termination was ultimately upheld. 
Hildebrand maintains that his termination was 
part of "a well-known and established practice to 
push out older workers through termination or 
forced resignation." (Appellant's Br. 5.) He contends 
that he became a victim of age-based discrimination 
beginning in 2009 when he was assigned a new 
supervisor who, he asserts, demoted him because of 
his age despite his satisfactory work performance. 
As part of his demotion, Hildebrand states that he 
was insulted on the basis of his age and relocated to 
an inferior workplace. He further alleges that the 
discrimination he faced was part of a hostile work 
environment that transcended the conduct of any 
one employee. 
On December 1, 2011, Hildebrand completed an 
Intake Questionnaire ("the Intake Questionnaire") 
with the EEOC, indicating that he was the victim 
of discrimination on the basis of his age. He also 
checked a box on the Intake Questionnaire authoriz-
ing the EEOC to investigate his claim and indicating 
that he "want[ed] to file a charge of discrimination." 
(EEOC Br. 3.) Subsequently, on January 11, 2012, 
Hildebrand completed a "Charge of Discrimination" 
with the EEOC, naming the Allegheny County Dis-
trict Attorney as the respondent. The EEOC issued a 
right-to-sue letter on May 7, 2012, and Hildebrand 
filed suit on August 7, 2012. 
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Hildebrand's complaint named Allegheny County 
("the County"), as well as the DA's Office, as defen-
dants. His complaint asserted violations of the ADEA, 
Title VII (retaliation), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (asserting 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to age-
based discrimination, as well as violation of his First 
Amendment free speech rights), the Pennsylvania 
Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 1421-1428, and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. 
§§ 951-963. His complaint also alleged: 
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under 
section 706 of Title VII, have occurred or 
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim 
of employment discrimination with the 
[EEOC]. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right 
to Sue. This Complaint is filed within 90 
days of such Notice of Right to Sue. 
(A.2.) 
The County and the DA's Office (collectively, 
"Appellees") separately filed motions to dismiss. On 
December 7, 2012, the District Court granted the 
motions to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim. The 
District Court also applied the pleading standards set 
forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, to Hildebrand's 
assertion that he satisfied all conditions precedent to 
filing suit under the ADEA. Analyzing Hildebrand's 
complaint in light of the lqbal/Twombly standard, the 
District Court stated: 
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Because [the complaint] fails to provide any 
facts, i.e. specific dates, as to when Plaintiff 
raised his claim with the EEOC and when 
the EEOC issued its right to sue letter to 
Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff failed to at-
tach his Right to Sue to the Complaint, ... 
the Complaint falls short of providing the 
facts to establish whether he has adequately 
exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(A.l12.) Accordingly, the Court dismissed the ADEA 
claim without prejudice. The District Court also 
dismissed Hildebrand's section 1983 claims without 
prejudice. 
Hildebrand filed an amended complaint, alleging 
with greater particularity that he satisfied all condi-
tions precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. Specif-
ically, he averred that he had filed a timely charge of 
discrimination, the EEOC had issued a right-to-sue 
letter, and he had filed the complaint within 90 days 
of notice of the right-to-sue. He attached his charge of 
discrimination and the EEOC right-to-sue letter to 
the amended complaint. 
Appellees each filed motions to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Hilde-
brand's- charge was untimely because it was filed 
more than 300 days after the last date of discrimina-
tion. Allegheny County also urged the District Court 
to dismiss Hildebrand's ADEA claim against the 
County on the additional ground that the charge of 
7a 
discrimination named only the DA's Office as a de-
fendant. 
Hildebrand attached to his responses to the 
motions his completed EEOC Intake Questionnaire. 
He contended that the completed Intake Question-
naire constitutes a charge and was filed within 300 
days of the last date of discrimination. 
On January 4, 2013, the District Court dismissed 
Hildebrand's amended complaint. The District Court 
first dismissed the ADEA claim, concluding that 
Hildebrand did not file a "charge of discrimination" 
with the EEOC within the requisite 300 days of the 
last date of discrimination. Specifically, the District 
Court found that the last date of alleged discrimina-
tion was Hildebrand's February 18, 2011 termination, 
and that the charge of discrimination filed on Janu-
ary 11, 2012 was therefore untimely. Thus, the Dis-
trict Court concluded that Hildebrand failed to 
sufficiently plead that he timely filed his claim with 
the EEOC "in light of the lqbal!Twombly standard." 
(A.307.) Finding that further amendment would be 
futile, the District Court dismissed the ADEA claim 
with prejudice. 
As to his § 1983 claims, the District Court held 
that Hildebrand failed to state a plausible claim 
against Allegheny County under a theory of munici-
pal liability, because he did not plead sufficient facts 
to support a plausible inference that the County had 
adopted a custom or practice of age discrimination. 
The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claims 
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against the DA's Office based on Hildebrand's conces-
sion that it was not a separate entity from the County 
for purposes of § 1983. Finally, having dismissed with 
prejudice all claims arising under federal law, the 
District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining claims asserted under 
the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act. 
II. Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over a decision granting a motion to 
dismiss. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 
128 (3d Cir.2010). Accordingly, "[w]e may affirm the 
district court on any ground supported by the record." 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d 
Cir.1999). 
A. Hildebrand's § 1983 Age Discrimina-
tion Claim 
We turn first to Hildebrand's claim brought 
under § 1983 that Appellees discriminated against 
him on the basis of his age, in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Allegheny County argues that the District Court 
properly dismissed this § 1983 cause of action, con-
tending that "[t]he ADEA 'is the exclusive remedy 
for claims of age discrimination in employment.'" 
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(Allegheny Cnty. Br. 19 (quoting Ahlmeyer v. Nev. 
Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th 
Cir.2009))). For the reasons that follow, we agree. 
1. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other per-
son within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... 
Rather than conferring any substantive rights, 
section 1983 "provides a method for vindicating 
federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 
510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 
(1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). "Nevertheless, § 1983 is a statutory remedy and 
Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace 
it with an alternative remedy." Smith v. Robinson, 
468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 
(1984), superseded by statute, Education of the 
Handicapped Act, § 615(e)(4) as amended, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(4). Thus, "[s]ection 1983 claims are not 
available ... where Congress has evinced an intent to 
lOa 
preclude such claims through other legislation." 
Ahlmeyer; 555 F.3d at 1055. 
In determining whether a statutory enactment 
precludes suit under § 1983, "[t]he crucial considera-
tion is what Congress intended." Smith, 468 U.S. at 
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Congressional intent to pre-
clude § 1983 claims may be inferred "[ w ]hen the 
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are 
sufficiently comprehensive." Middlesex Cnty. Sewer-
age Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-
21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). In Sea 
Clammers, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff 
was precluded from bringing a§ 1983 suit for damag-
es under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976), 
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-
ies Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976). 453 
U.S. at 20-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615. Emphasizing the 
"unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of the 
statutory framework, id. at 13, 101 S.Ct. 2615, the 
Court concluded that "[a]llowing parallel § 1983 
claims to proceed ... would have thwarted Congress' 
intent in formulating and detailing these provisions." 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 
253, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009). 
The Supreme Court has also held that § 1983 
suits were precluded by statute in a case where a 
plaintiff sought vindication of a constitutional -
rather than a statutory- right. See Smith, 468 U.S. 
992, 104 S.Ct. 3457. In Smith, plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
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Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting a 
deprivation of the right to "a free appropriate public 
education" for their handicapped child. Id. at 1009, 
104 S.Ct. 3457. Focusing once again on the "compre-
hensive nature of the procedures and guarantees" set 
forth in the statute's remedial scheme, the Court 
concluded that Congress did not intend to "leave 
undisturbed the ability of a handicapped child to go 
directly to court with an equal protection claim to a 
free appropriate public education." Id. at 1011, 104 
S.Ct. 3457. Permitting such suits, the Court observed, 
would "[a]llow[] a plaintiff to circumvent" congres-
sional intent. Id. at 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457. 
Subsequently, in Rancho Palos ~rdes v. Abrams, 
544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005), 
the Court again found that a comprehensive remedial 
statutory framework precluded suit under § 1983. 
The plaintiff in Rancho Palos Verdes filed suit under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and for damages 
under § 1983. Id. at 115, 125 S.Ct. 1453. Applying its 
prior decisions in Sea Clammers and Smith, the 
Court ruled that the Telecommunications Act's reme-
dial scheme would be "distort[ed]" by direct enforce-
ment through§ 1983. Id. at 127, 125 S.Ct. 1453. 
Most recently, the Court considered whether Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a), precludes § 1983 claims of sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 249, 129 S.Ct. 788. In Fitzger-
ald, the plaintiffs alleged that their daughter, then an 
elementary school student, suffered several incidents 
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of sexual harassment by another student while on the 
school bus, and that the school's response to their 
allegations had been inadequate. Id. at 250, 129 S.Ct. 
788. The plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that their 
daughter had suffered sex discrimination in violation 
of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional 
claims, holding that Title IX provided the sole remedy 
for sex discrimination in the education context. Id. at 
251, 129 S.Ct. 788. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. 
Reiterating that "the crucial consideration is what 
Congress intended," id. (citation omitted), the Court 
signaled that its analysis of congressional intent 
might differ depending upon whether the right as-
serted under § 1983 arises from a statute or the 
Constitution: 
In those cases in which the § 1983 claim is 
based on a statutory right, evidence of such 
congressional intent may be found directly in 
the statute creating the right, or inferred 
from the statute's creation of a comprehen-
sive enforcement scheme that is incompati-
ble with individual enforcement under 
§ 1983. In cases in which the § 1983 claim 
alleges a constitutional violation, lack of con-
gressional intent may- be inferred from a 
comparison of the rights and protections of 
the statute and those existing under the 
Constitution. Where the contours of such 
rights and protections diverge in significant 
ways, it is not likely that Congress intended 
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to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitu-
tional rights. 
Id. at 252-53, 129 S.Ct. 788 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
Notwithstanding the distinction between statuto-
rily-created rights and constitutionally-conferred 
rights, the Court emphasized that, "[i]n determining 
whether a subsequent statute precludes enforcement 
of a federal right under § 1983 ... primary emphasis 
[is placed] on the nature and extent of that statute's 
remedial scheme." Id. This was true even where 
plaintiffs, such as those in Smith, "relied on§ 1983 to 
assert independent constitutional rights," rather than 
statutory rights. Id. Indeed, the Court observed that 
in each of the cases where it found a statute to be the 
exclusive remedy for an asserted right, "the statutes 
at issue required plaintiffs to comply with particular 
procedures and/or to exhaust particular administra-
tive remedies prior to filing suit," and "'[a]llowing a 
plaintiff to circumvent' the statutes' provisions [by 
suing directly under § 1983] would have been 'incon-
sistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme.'" Id. 
at 254-55, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457). 
_ Turning to the question of whether Title IX 
precludes suit under § 1983 for sex discrimination, 
the Court first found that Title IX does not provide a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, emphasizing 
that Title IX's "remedies - withdrawal of federal 
funds and an implied cause of action - stand in stark 
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contrast to the 'unusually elaborate,' 'carefully tai-
lored,' and 'restrictive' enforcement schemes of the 
statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Ran-
cho Palos Verdes." !d. at 255, 129 S.Ct. 788. The 
Court observed that Title IX does not contain an 
administrative exhaustion requirement or a notice 
provision. Id. Affording particular weight to Title IX's 
lack of an express private right of action, the Court 
noted that it "has never held that an implied right of 
action had the effect of precluding suit under§ 1983." 
!d. Given the absence in Title IX of a detailed reme-
dial scheme, the Court concluded that "parallel and 
concurrent § 1983 claims will neither circumvent 
required procedures, nor allow access to new reme-
dies." Id. at 255-56, 129 S.Ct. 788. The Court found 
further support for its conclusion that gender discrim-
ination covered by Title IX could be pursued by way 
of a § 1983 suit by analyzing "the substantive rights 
and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under 
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 256, 129 S.Ct. 
788. The Court found that "Title IX's protections are -
narrower in some respects and broader in others." Id. 
For instance, Title IX exempts several activities that 
can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, 
such as discrimination in admissions decisions of 
elementary and secondary schools, and all activities 
of military service schools, as we11 as traditionally 
single-sex public colleges. Id. at 257, 129 S.Ct. 788. 
Additionally, the Court cited incongruous standards 
for establishing liability under Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause, explaining that, while "a Title IX 
plaintiff can establish school district liability by 
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showing that a single school administrator with 
authority to take corrective action responded ... with 
deliberate indifference," the same plaintiff would be 
required to show a municipal policy, custom, or prac-
tice under § 1983. Id. at 257-58, 129 S.Ct. 788. Be-
cause of this disparity in coverage, as well as Title 
IX's lack of a comprehensive enforcement framework, 
the Fitzgerald Court concluded that, in passing Title 
IX, Congress did not intend to preclude sex discrimi-
nation claims in the context of education under 
§ 1983. Id. at 258, 129 S.Ct. 788. 
2. 
Prior to Fitzgerald, a number of our sister Courts 
of Appeals had held that the ADEA precludes § 1983 
claims of age discrimination. See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d 
at 1057; Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742 (1st 
Cir.2003); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (lOth 
Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds by Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110, 120 
S.Ct. 928, 145 L.Ed.2d 806 (2000); Lafleur v. Tex. 
Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1997); 
Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C.Cir.1991); 
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364 
(4th Cir.1989). The Seventh Circuit- the only Court 
of Appeals to consider this question after Fitzgerald -,-
however, reached the opposite conclusion. See Levin v. 
Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (2012). 
The leading case concluding that the ADEA 
precludes § 1983 claims of age discrimination is 
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Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, 868 F.2d 
1364. See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056. In Zombro, the 
Fourth Circuit held that Congress intended the 
ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for claims of age 
discrimination, reasoning that private causes of 
action brought directly under § 1983 "would severely 
undermine, if not debilitate, the enforcement mecha-
nism created by Congress under the ADEA." 868 F.2d 
at 1369. Zombro focused on the ADEA's comprehen-
sive statutory scheme, which "was structured to 
facilitate and encourage compliance through an 
informal process of conciliation and mediation." Id. at 
1366. Providing a plaintiff with "direct and immedi-
ate access to the federal courts" via § 1983 could 
result in "the comprehensive administrative pro-
cess .... be[ing] bypassed, and the goal of compliance 
through mediation .... be[ing] discarded." Id. Given 
these concerns, the Zombro court reached what it 
deemed "[t]he inescapable conclusion" that the ADEA 
precludes suits under § 1983 for age discrimination. 
Id. at 1366-67. 
Mter Zombro, the Courts of Appeals for the First, 
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits 
agreed. See Tapia-Tapia~ 322 F.3d at 745; Lafleur, 126 
F.3d at 760; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057; Migneault, 
158 F.3d at 1140; Chennareddy, 935 F.2d at 318. In 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzgerald, 
however, the Seventh Circuit diverged from this 
consensus view, concluding instead that the ADEA 
does not preclude constitutional claims of age 
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discrimination asserted under § 1983. Levin, 692 F.3d 
at 617. 
While recognizing that "the ADEA sets forth a 
rather comprehensive remedial scheme," id. at 618, 
Levin interpreted Fitzgerald as setting a higher bar 
for inferring preclusive intent in cases where a plain-
tiff alleges a constitutional violation. Id. To imply 
congressional intent to preclude constitutional claims, 
the Levin court held that "some additional indication 
of congressional intent" is required. Id. at 619. Em-
phasizing that the ADEA lacks express language 
evincing congressional intent to preclude§ 1983 suits, 
Levin considered the statute's purpose. The court 
reasoned that "the ADEA does not purport to provide 
a remedy for violation of constitutional rights," but 
rather, "it provides a mechanism to enforce only the 
substantive rights created by the ADEA itself." Id. at 
619 (citing Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1373 (Murnaghan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Levin then distinguished 
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, which found 
that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
("IDEA"), Pub.L. 94-142, precluded suit under § 1983 
for a Constitutional violation, explaining that the 
IDEA was passed to address the constitutional re-
quirement to provide a public education for handi-
capped children. Id. at 619. Without express language 
addressing preclusion, and "absent any additional 
indication from Congress," the Levin Court declined 
to infer an intent to preclude constitutional claims of 
discrimination. Id. at 620. The court in Levin then 
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compared the rights and protections offered by the 
ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause, and found 
several significant differences: first, an ADEA plain-
tiff may sue only an employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization, whereas a § 1983 plaintiff is free 
to sue any individual who "caused or participated in 
the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's constitution-
al rights"; second, the ADEA limits claims by certain 
individuals, such as elected officials, who are not 
exempted from bringing suit under§ 1983; and third, 
unlike under § 1983, state employees are effectively 
barred from bringing suit under the ADEA because 
their employers are shielded by Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. !d. at 621. In light of these differences, and 
in the absence of express congressional intent to the 
contrary, the Levin court concluded that the ADEA is 
not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination 
claims. Id. at 621-22. 
3. 
We agree with the Levin court that the issue of 
whether the ADEA precludes a§ 1983 cause of action 
for age discrimination in employment presents a 
"close call." Id. at 617. Contrary to Levin, however, we 
conclude that, on balance, the relevant considerations 
weigh in favor of finding that the ADEA does indeed 
bar such § 1983 claims. 
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that 
the comprehensiveness of a statute's remedial scheme 
is the primary factor in determining congressional 
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intent. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 253, 129 S.Ct. 788 
("[W]e have placed primary emphasis on the nature 
and extent of [a] statute's remedial scheme.") (em-
phasis added). Fitzgerald reaffirms the Court's juris-
prudence on this issue as articulated in Sea 
Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes. Id. at 
254, 129 S.Ct. 788 (observing that, in each of prior 
cases, "[o]ffering plaintiffs a direct route to court via 
§ 1983 would have circumvented [the relevant stat-
ute's comprehensive] procedures."). Indeed, Fitzgerald 
cited with approval the Court's statement in Sea 
Clammers that, "[ w ]hen the remedial devices provid-
ed in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, 
they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent 
to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. at 
253, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 
at 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615) (emphasis added). To be sure, 
Fitzgerald's analysis of the different substantive 
protections afforded by Title IX and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause provides an additional framework for 
determining whether a section 1983 cause of action is 
foreclosed. Nevertheless, we do not believe it dis-
turbed the basic principle that, absent indications to 
the contrary, we may infer that Congress intended to 
preclude § 1983 claims when it provides a sufficiently 
comprehensive remedial scheme for the vindication of 
a federal constitutional right. 
Thus, we cannot agree with Levin that Congress 
must provide some "additional indication" of its 
intent. Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. Fitzgerald does not 
suggest the need for a statement of "clear or manifest 
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congressional intent in either the language of the 
statute or the legislative history," as Levin requires. 
See Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. Rather, Fitzgerald reaf-
firmed the principle that, where a statute imposes 
procedural requirements or provides for administra-
tive remedies, permitting a plaintiff to proceed direct-
ly to court via § 1983 would be "inconsistent with 
Congress' carefully tailored scheme." Fitzgerald, 555 
U.S. at 255, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457). 
Here, there can be no debate that the ADEA 
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme. Under 
the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to, among 
other things, "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual ... because of such individual's age." 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA expressly provides a 
private right of action to employees. Id. § 626(c). 
Before an employee may file suit under the ADEA, 
however, a plaintiff is required to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC. Id. § 626(d)(l). The EEOC is then 
directed to notify all respondents named in the em-
ployee's charge of discrimination and. to "promptly 
seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by 
informal methods of conciliation, conference, and 
persuasion." Id. § 626(d)(2). Unless the EEOC elects 
to file suit to enforce the employee's claim, an em-
ployee may commence suit sixty days after filing a 
charge. Id. §§ 626(c)(l), (d)(l). In light of these re-
quirements, we agree with the majority of our sister 
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Courts of Appeals that this scheme would be under-
mined if plaintiffs could sue directly under § 1983. 
See, e.g., Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366 ("[Under § 1983, 
the] plaintiff would have direct and immediate access 
to the federal courts, the comprehensive administra-
tive process would be bypassed, and the goal of com-
pliance through mediation would be discarded."). 
Moreover, we do not believe that the rights and 
protections of the ADEA and the Equal Protection 
Clause differ in such significant ways as to demon-
strate congressional intent to allow parallel § 1983 
claims alleging age discrimination. The ADEA is 
intended to "promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit 
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to 
help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, age classifications receive only rational 
basis review. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) 
("States may discriminate on the basis of age without 
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age 
classification -in question is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest."). By prohibiting "arbitrary 
age discrimination," the ADEA encompasses the 
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
while significantly expanding prohibitions on age 
discrimination elsewhere. 
Although, as the Levin court emphasizes, the 
potential defendants are different under the ADEA 
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and § 1983,1 we do not believe this distinction signifi-
cant enough to demonstrate congressional intent to 
permit both claims. Additionally, we think the fact 
that certain government employees are either ex-
empted from the ADEA, or limited to certain reme-
dies, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f), demonstrates 
congressional intent to specifically define the rights of 
those employees rather than to permit such employ-
ees to circumvent these limitations by filing directly 
under§ 1983. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15, 101 
S.Ct. 2615 ("In the absence of strong indicia of a 
contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to 
conclude that Congress provided precisely the reme-
dies it considered appropriate."). 
"We do not lightly conclude that Congress in-
tended to preclude reliance on§ 1983 as a remedy for 
a substantial equal protection claim." Smith, 468 U.S. 
at 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Because we believe, however, 
that § 1983 suits are "inconsistent with Congress' 
carefully tailored scheme," id., we join the majority of 
Courts of Appeals in concluding that Congress in-
tended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for 
claims of age discrimination in employment. Accord-
ingly, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
Hildebrand's § 1983 claim of age discrimination. 
1 Under the ADEA, a plaintiff may sue his employer, an 
employment agency, or a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 623. 
In contrast, a § 1983 plaintiff can sue an individual whose 
actions caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Kuhn v. 
Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555-56 (7th Cir.2012). 
23a 
B. Hildebrand's § 1983 Retaliation Claims 
Hildebrand seeks vindication for two additional 
alleged violations under § 1983, contending that he 
was retaliated against for his use of the internal 
grievance process in violation of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, and that he was retaliated 
against on the basis of his political patronage in 
violation of the First Amendment. The District Court 
dismissed these allegations along with Hildebrand's 
§ 1983 age discrimination claim, finding that he had 
failed to adequately plead that the County adopted a 
custom or practice of such discrimination. The Dis-
trict Court also found, albeit in a footnote, that Hil-
debrand's amended complaint "fail[ed] to pinpoint 
with any clarity which of his Constitutional rights 
were negatively impacted by [Allegheny County]," 
that the allegations of First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment violations were conclusory in nature, and that 
they therefore "fail[ed] to meet the lqbal/Twombly 
standard." (A. 313 n. 5.) As to the claims of retalia-
tion, we agree with the District Court's analysis. 
Hildebrand brought each of these claims against 
Allegheny County under a theory of municipal liabil-
ity, which requires him to demonstrate either that the 
County officially adopted a "policy," or unofficially 
adopted a "custom," of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 
611 (1978). Hildebrand concededly proceeded on all 
§ 1983 claims under a "custom" theory. "A plaintiff 
may establish a custom ... by showing that a given 
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course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed 
or authorized by law, is so well-settled and perma-
nent as virtually to constitute law." Watson v. Abing-
ton Twp., 4 78 F. 3d 144, 155-56 (3d Cir.2007) (citing 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 
(3d Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In his amended complaint, Hildebrand made the 
following averments of retaliation: he alleged that he 
was retaliated against by the Chief Detective and the 
Assistant Chief Detective at the DA's Office after he 
made a good faith report expressing concerns about a 
fellow detective (A. 136 'II 'II S-T); that he was similarly 
retaliated against by the same individuals after 
reporting a concern about the Office's procedure for 
charging drug crimes (!d. 138 'II X); that he was 
retaliated against by the Assistant Chief Detective 
after he filed an internal grievance against him 
alleging age-based harassment (!d. 139-40 '!I'll BB-
DD); that he was subsequently demoted in retaliation 
for his complaints about the drug charging proce-
dures (!d. 142 'II JJ); and that he was harassed after 
members of the DA's Office learned that he had 
previously made political contributions to Joan Orie 
Melvin in her candidacy for the Pennsylvania Su-. 
preme Court (!d. 145-46 'II WW). Notwithstanding 
these allegations of retaliation and harassment on 
the part of certain high-ranking officials at the DA's 
Office, Hildebrand does not allege that Allegheny 
County established a custom of retaliating against 
supporters of Ms. Melvin, or against Hildebrand or 
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other employees who utilized the internal grievance 
process. 
While Hildebrand's brief on appeal reasserts his 
claim of retaliation, it does not point to any facts 
demonstrating that there existed a custom in Alle-
gheny County to retaliate against employees on these 
bases. Rather, the portion of Hildebrand's brief dedi-
cated to discussing his allegations in support of 
municipal liability relate solely to his claims of age 
discrimination. We therefore agree with the District 
Court that Hildebrand failed to set forth a plausible 
claim for relief against Allegheny County for retalia-
tion, and we will affirm their dismissal on that basis. 
C. Hildebrand's ADEA Claims 
Having determined that Hildebrand's § 1983 
claims were properly dismissed, we now turn to the 
District Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA 
claim. 
1. Whether the lqbal/Twombly Plead-
ing Standards Apply to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
9(c) 
A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must 
exhaust his or her administrative remedies as man-
dated by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Section 626(d) requires 
plaintiffs in "deferral states" such as Pennsylvania, 
which have a state agency with authority to investi-
gate claims of employment discrimination, to file 
charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the last 
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date of alleged discrimination. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)(2) 
& 633(b); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 
851, 854 (3d Cir.2000). A plaintiff's obligation to 
timely file with the EEOC is a condition precedent to 
filing suit under the ADEA. Seredinski v. Clifton 
Precision Prods. Co., Diu. of Litton Sys., Inc., 776 F.2d 
56, 64 (3d Cir.1985) (Sarokin, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
The pleading of a condition precedent is governed 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), which pro-
vides: 
Conditions Precedent. In pleading conditions 
precedent, it suffices to allege generally that 
all conditions precedent have occurred or 
been performed. But when denying that a 
condition precedent has occurred or been 
performed, a party must do so with particu-
larity. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). 
Here, Hildebrand's original complaint alleged: 
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under 
section 706 of Title VII, have occurred or 
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim 
of employment discrimination with the 
_[EEOC]. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right 
to Sue. This complaint is filed within 90 days 
of such Notice of Right to Sue. 
(A.2.) 
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The District Court dismissed Hildebrand's ADEA 
claim, holding that he failed to sufficiently plead the 
satisfaction of this condition precedent. Specifically, 
the District Court applied the pleading standards set 
forth in Twombly and Iqbal, which held that Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to 
allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 
S.Ct. 1955; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 
1937. 
The District Court erred by applying Iqbal and 
Twombly to Hildebrand's pleading of the conditions 
precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. Iqbal and 
Twombly interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
S(a), which governs the standard for pleading a claim 
for relief. The pleading of conditions precedent is 
governed by Rule 9(c), not Rule S(a). Neither Iqbal 
nor Twombly purport to alter Rule 9. We see no 
indication that those cases sought to override the 
plain language of Rule 9(c), and we therefore conclude 
that the pleading of conditions precedent falls outside 
the strictures of Iqbal and Twombly. 
2. The Intake Questionnaire 
Our conclusion that the District Court erred in 
applying Iqbal and Twombly to the pleading of condi-
tions precedent does not end our inquiry. Following 
the dismissal of his first complaint, Hildebrand filed 
an amended complaint, which alleged his satisfaction 
of the ADEA's conditions precedent in greater detail. 
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Specifically, Hildebrand alleged that he had filed a 
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the last 
date of discrimination. He attached his charge of 
discrimination to his amended complaint. 
In their motions to dismiss the amended com-
plaint, Appellees contested Hildebrand's asserted 
final date of discrimination, contending that the last 
date of discrimination was his February 18, 2011 
termination. Under this reasoning, Hildebrand's 
charge of discrimination, which he filed on January 
11, 2012, would be untimely. In response to the mo-
tions to dismiss, Hildebrand argued that the EEOC 
Intake Questionnaire, which he filed on December 1, 
2011, constituted a timely-filed charge of discrimina-
tion. 
The District Court dismissed Hildebrand's ADEA 
claims with prejudice, concluding that the last date of 
discrimination was February 18, 2011, and that the 
January 11, 2012 charge was therefore untimely. The 
District Court did not consider the Intake Question-
naire. 2 We agree that Hildebrand's Intake Question-
naire constitutes a timely filed charge. 
2 Hildebrand concedes that the Intake Questionnaire was 
not attached to his amended complaint. He did, however, submit 
the questionnaire as an exhibit to his response to Allegheny 
County's motion to dismiss. While a court is limited to consider-
ing the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we are 
satisfied that the Intake Questionnaire was properly before the 
District Court. There was no dispute as to its authenticity, and it 
directly corroborated Hildebrand's claim that he had satisfied 
(Continued on following page) 
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An EEOC filing constitutes a charge of discrimi-
nation if it satisfies the requirements of 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1626.6, and can "reasonably [be] construed as a 
request for [the EEOC] to take remedial action to 
protect the employee's rights." Fed. Express Corp. v. 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 
L.Ed.2d 10 (2008). In Holowecki, the Supreme Court 
adopted a "permissive" interpretation of the charge 
requirement, explaining that a "wide range of docu-
ments," including an intake questionnaire, "may be 
classified as charges." I d. at 402, 128 S.Ct. 114 7. 
Following Holowecki, the EEOC revised its 
Intake Questionnaire to require claimants to check a 
box to request that the EEOC take remedial action. 
This box, commonly referred to as "Box 2," states: 
I want to file a charge of discrimination, and 
I authorize the EEOC to look into the dis-
crimination I described above. I understand 
that the EEOC must give the employer, un-
ion, or employment agency that I accuse of 
discrimination information about the charge, 
including my name .... 
(A.262, 291). Under the revised form, an employee 
who completes the Intake Questionnaire and checks 
the conditions precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. See 
Mayer u. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.2010) ("In deciding 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the com-
plaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public 
record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the 
complainant's claims are based upon these documents."). 
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Box 2 unquestionably files a charge of discrimination. 
Hildebrand did precisely this. Additionally, Hilde-
brand's questionnaire is dated December 1, 2011, 
which is within 300 days of the February 18, 2011 
letter of suspension and notice of termination. Thus, 
it was timely filed. 
The Intake Questionnaire did not, however, 
preserve Hildebrand's claim against Allegheny Coun-
ty. As the County observes, Hildebrand's EEOC 
Intake Questionnaire names "Allegheny County 
District Attorney's Office" as the only respondent. 
Thus, it fails to allege any discrimination on the part 
of the County. We will therefore vacate the District 
Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA claim as to 
the DA's Office because the Intake Questionnaire was 
a timely filed charge of discrimination, but we will 
affirm dismissal of the ADEA claim against Allegheny 
County, because the Intake Questionnaire demon-
strates that Hildebrand failed to timely exhaust his 
administrative remedies as to the County. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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JUDGMENT 
(Filed Jun. 27, 2014) 
This cause came to be considered on the record 
from the United States District Court for the Western 
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District of Pennsylvania and was argued on No-
vember 7, 2013. On consideration whereof, it is now 
hereby 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that 
the order of the District Court entered January 4, 
2013 be and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED in part 
and VACATED in part. Costs shall not be taxed in 
this matter. All of the above in accordance with the 
Opinion of this Court. 
ATTEST: 
s/ Marcia M. Waldron, 
Clerk 
Dated: June 27, 2014 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 














(Filed Jan. 4, 2013) 
For the second time, there are two separate 
Motions to Dismiss before this Court. This time, the 
Motions seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint (doc. no. 15) which was filed subsequent to this 
Court's prior Opinion and Order (doc. nos. 13 and 14) 
granting in part Defendants' prior Motions to Dis-
miss, but allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to file an 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed his Amended 
Complaint on December 13, 2012. Doc. no. 15. 
Defendant Allegheny County (" AC") and Defen-
dant Allegheny County District Attorney's Office 
("DA's Office") filed their respective Motions to Dis-
miss the Amended Complaint in its entirety under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See doc nos. 16 and 17, respec-
tively. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to each 
34a 
Motion to Dismiss. See doc. nos. 21 and 23, respec-
tively. 
The matters are now ripe for adjudication. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal 
courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the 
heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2) requires only "'a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of 
what the ... claim is and the grounds on which it 
rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4 7 
(1957)). 
Building upon the landmark United States 
Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that a Dis-
trict Court must undertake the following three steps 
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: 
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the ele-
ments a plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim." Second, the court should identify al-
legations that, "because they are no more 
than conclusions, are not entitled to the as-
sumption of truth." Third, "whe[n] there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 
should assume their veracity and then de-
termine whether they plausibly give rise to 
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an entitlement for relief." This means that 
our inquiry is normally broken into three 
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the 
claim, (2) reviewing the Complaint to strike 
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking 
at the well-pleaded components of the Com-
plaint and evaluating whether all of the ele-
ments identified in part one of the inquiry 
are sufficiently alleged. 
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). 
The third step of the sequential evaluation 
requires this Court to consider the specific nature of 
the claims presented and to determine whether the 
facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to 
show a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 
210. "While legal conclusions can provide the frame-
work of a Complaint, they must be supported by 
factual allegations." Id. at 210-11; see also Malleus, 
641 F.3d at 560. 
This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely 
because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plain-
tiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately 
prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. 
Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts al-
leged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 
556. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides 
adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where" 
will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 
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212; see also Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 
346 F. App'x. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009). 
In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be 
granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if estab-
lished at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 563 n.8. 
II. DISCUSSION - DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS1 
A. Count I -Age Discrimination ("ADEA") 
Defendant AC argues that Count I of the Com-
plaint- Plaintiff's ADEA claim- should be dismissed 
because: (1) Plaintiff filed his EEOC charge against 
the DA's Office, not AC; and (2) Plaintiff failed to 
timely file his EEOC charge within three hundred 
days of the last discriminatory act thereby failing to 
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing 
this lawsuit. Defendant DA's Office similarly argues 
that Plaintiff's ADEA claim should be dismissed 
1 As noted in its prior Opinion, because the Court writes 
primarily for the parties who are familiar with the details of this 
case, and because the Court accepts all well-pled facts set forth 
in Plaintifrs Amended Complaint as true for purposes of 
deciding these Motions to Dismiss, the Court has declined to 
provide a separate recitation of the relevant facts as pled by 
Plaintiff. To the extent the Court found that the recitation of 
any of the facts was necessary, those facts have been set forth 
within the individual sub-parts of the "Discussion" section 
herein. 
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because he failed to timely file his EEOC complaint 
within 300 days of the last discriminatory act. 
Because both parties raised the timeliness of the 
filing of Plaintiff's EEOC charge as one of the bases 
upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's ADEA claim, the 
Court will address that matter first. As this Court 
previously noted, a party seeking relief for employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII must first estab-
lish that he timely filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), 
that he received a right to sue letter, and that he filed 
his Complaint in Federal Court within ninety days of 
his receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the 
EEOC. See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough 
of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). The 
ADEA requires a person to file a "charge of discrimi-
nation" with the EEOC: 
(A) within 180 days after the alleged 
unlawful practice occurred; or 
(B) in a case to which section 633(b) of 
this Title applies, within 300 days after the 
alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 
30 days after receipt by the individual of no-
tice of termination proceedings under state 
law, whichever is earlier. 
29 U.S.C. § 626(d). "Like Title VII, [the] ADEA has 
deferral provisions and the time for filing a charge 
depends on whether deferral applies. In deferral 
states, such as Pennsylvania, the charge must be 
filed within 300 days of the allegedly illegal act." 
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Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 382-3 (3d Cir. 
2007), quoting Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods. 
Co., 776 F.2d 56, 63 (3d Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted). 
Thus, a judicial complaint under the ADEA will 
be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies if the supporting EEOC charge was not filed 
within 300 days of notification to the employee of the 
adverse employment action. 
Turning to this case, the Court begins by noting 
that in its prior Memorandum Opinion, the Court 
stated it would issue an Order granting Defendant 
AC's Motion to Dismiss the ADEA claim because 
Plaintiff had merely pled a legal conclusion asserting 
that he met "all conditions precedent" to filing an 
ADEA claim. See doc. no. 13, p. 4. However, in this 
same portion of the Opinion, this Court clearly indi-
cated that despite the fact it was granting Defendant 
AC's Motion to Dismiss the ADEA claim, it was doing 
so "without prejudice to allow Plaintiff time to file an 
Amended Complaint establishing the factual basis to 
support the legal conclusion that he has exhausted 
his administrative remedies." Id. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (doc. no. 15), 
which was filed shortly after the Court issued its 
prior Opinion, contains the following facts relevant 
to the exhaustion and timeliness issue now re-raised 
by Defendant AC and raised by Defendant DA's 
Office: 
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10. On February 18, 2011, the [DA's 
Office] and AC terminated [Plaintiff's] em-
ployment. 
* * * 
[12.] NNN. On February 18, 2011, 
[Plaintiff] was suspended for five (5) days 
without pay. [Plaintiff] filed a grievance with 
Dawn Botsford on March 8, 2011. The hear-
ing lasted twenty (20) minutes. Botsford af-
firmed the five (5) day suspension of 
[Plaintiff] without pay .... 
* * * 
[12.] PPP. On March 31, 2011[,] the un-
ion voted not to appeal [Plaintiff's] grievance 
and he was terminated on May 7, 2011. 
* * * 
The Termination of Detective Hildebrand 
13. On or about February 1, 2011, 
[Plaintiff] was suspended without pay for 
unauthorized use of a government vehicle. 
The automobile use resulted in [Plaintiff's] 
termination on or about February 18, 2011. 
14. [Plaintiff] was given no reason for 
his termination in the February 18, 2011let-
ter discharging him sent by Logan. 
15. A March 14, 2011 letter sent [to] 
[Plaintiff] by Dawn Botsford is when 
Hildbrand first heard he was discharged for 
lying to his supervisors in addition to his 
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personal use of the DA supplied motor vehi-
cle. Prior to this date, [Plaintiff] was advised 
he was terminated only for unauthorized use 
of a DA issued vehicle. 
Doc. no. 15, Cfl«Jl 10, 12 NNN, 12 PPP, 13-15. 
Plaintiff attached to his Amended Complaint, 
several documents which this Court may also con-
sider. Relevant to the exhaustion and timeliness 
argument are his EEOC Charge of Discrimination 
(hereinafter "Charge") ( Exhibit 1 to the Amended 
Complaint, doc. no. 15-1), and a letter f:rom Dennis 
Logan, Chief of Detectives, County of Allegheny, 
Office of the District Attorney, dated February 18, 
2011 (hereinafter "February 18, 2011 Letter"). Exhibit 
3 to the Amended Complaint, doc. no. 15-3. 
The Charge, prepared by Plaintiff and/or his 
counsel, indicates that the document was filed on Jan 
11, 2012. Doc. no. 15-1, p. 1. The document also 
identifies the earliest date of discrimination as "02-
01-2011," and the latest date of discrimination as "04-
30-2011." Id. The relevant "particulars" set forth 
within the Charge read as follows: 
!d. 
2. On February 18, 2011, Chief Dennis 
Logan suspended me for five (5) days without 
pay for unauthorized use of a government 
vehicle. On April 30, 2011, Chief Dennis 
Logan told me I was discharged for being un-
truthful. 
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The February 18, 2011 Letter, signed by Chief 
Dennis Logan, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
I suspended you for five (5) days without 
pay, pending discharge, effective February 
11, 2011 for charges outlined in the Discipli-
nary Action Report ("DAR"), a copy of which 
I gave to you on February 1, 2011. You were 
given five (5) work days to respond in writing- - --- -----
stating the reason or reasons why you should 
not be discharged. I have received and read 
your response letter and find it unsatisfacto-
ry. Therefore, you are terminated from em-
ployment with the Allegheny County District 
Attorney's Office effective February 18, 
2011 .... 
Doc. No. 15-3. 
As is evident from the statements made within 
the four corners of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, as 
well as within those documents attached to the 
Amended Complaint, inconsistencies exist with 
respect to the actual date of Plaintiff's termination.2 
However,. this Court notes that paragraphs 10, 13 and 
14 of the Amended Complaint (quoted above) all 
indicate that Plaintiff was terminated on February 
2 In deciding Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
courts generally consider only the allegations in the Complaint, 
exhibits attached to the Complaint, matters of public record, and 
documents that form the basis of a claim. See In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); 
accord Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
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18, 2011, and these statements are corroborated by 
the statement set forth within the February 18, 2011 
Letter, attached to the Amended Complaint. 
However, Plaintiff provided a few dates which 
post-date Plaintiff's February 18, 2011 termination. 
These can be found at paragraphs "12. NNN." and 
"12. PPP." of the Amended Complaint as well as the 
April 30, 2011 date set forth in the Charge. See doc 
no. 15, 'II'II 12. NNN. and 12. PPP.; and doc. no. 15-1. 
The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to provide any 
facts in his Amended Complaint related to the April 
30, 2011 date, which he identified in his Charge as 
the "latest" date discrimination took place. In fact, 
there is no mention of the April 30, 2011 date in the 
Amended Complaint. Thus, the only information 
related to the April 30, 2011 date is Plaintiff's state-
ment found within the Charge where Plaintiff indi-
cated that "Chief Dennis Logan told me I was 
discharged for being untruthful." Doc. No. 15-1. 
Plaintiff fails to explain how this statement allegedly 
made on April 30, 2011 can be construed as an act of 
age discrimination against Plaintiff. 
In addition, sub-paragraphs "12. NNN."_ and "12. 
PPP." provide facts concerning Plaintiff's termination 
date which conflict with facts stated elsewhere in the 
Amended Complaint and in the exhibits attached to 
the Amended Complaint. Sub-paragraph "12. NNN." 
indicates Plaintiff was suspended for five days on 
February 18, 2011 - not terminated. Sub-paragraph 
"12. PPP." reads that Plaintiff was terminated on May 
7, 2011. 
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Because this Court has already provided Plaintiff 
with an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint 
establishing the requisite factual basis upon which an 
ADEA claim could survive a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and given 
what counsel for Plaintiff has submitted, this Court 
finds that there is no plausible basis upon which 
Plaintiff's ADEA claim can proceed. 
First, most of the assertions made by Plaintiff in 
his Amended Complaint allege that the last act of 
discriminatory conduct arose on February 18, 2011 -
the date Plaintiff was terminated from his employ-
ment - and this is corroborated by the February 18, 
2011 Letter which Plaintiff attached to his Amended 
Complaint. 
Next, the Court further finds that the other, 
seemingly contradictory, allegations concerning the 
date of the last discriminatory act which Plaintiff 
asserts in his Amended Complaint (and one of which 
is set forth in his Charge), are either non-
discriminatory acts (i.e., Chief Logan stating to 
Plaintiff on April 30, 2011, that he was discharged for 
being untruthful)_ and/or are merely dates for which 
Plaintiff provided no corroboration (i.e., the termina-
tion date ofMay 7, 2011). 
Thus, in light of the lqbal/Twombly standard, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and 
attached documentation fail to adequately plead that 
a timely ADEA claim was filed within three hundred 
(300) days of the date of the last act of the alleged 
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discrimination - Plaintiff's February 18, 2011 termi-
nation. In light of the factual assertions made by 
Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint, the Court finds 
that allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 
Complaint a second time would be futile. 3 
Accordingly, the Court is constrained to concur 
with Defendants AC and DA's Office that Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint fails to provide facts necessary 
to establish that he fimely [sic] filed is EEOC claim 
within three hundred days of February 18, 2011. 
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motions 
to Dismiss Count I ofthe Complaint, with prejudice.4 
B. Count III- Section 1983 Claim 
This Court cited the following law in its prior 
Opinion, and finds that a discussion of this law will 
8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted with 
prejudice. See, In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997) (" ... a district court may exercise 
its discretion and deny leave to amend on the basis of ... 
futility."). 
• In light of this determination, the Court will not address 
Defendant AC's argument wherein it contends that because 
Plaintiff failed to file the EEOC Charge against Defendant AC, 
Defendant AC cannot be held legally liable for any viable ADEA 
claim filed by Plaintiff. Similarly, the Court will not address 
Defendant DA's argument that Plaintiff's Complaint was filed 
with this Court two days too late, and thus, not timely filed 
within ninety (90) days from the day he received his Right to 
Sue Notice. 
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again be revelant [sic] to the Defendants' Motions, 
and thus, restates same herein: 
Title 42 of the United States Code, 
§ 1983 states that, "[e]very person who, un-
der color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory ... subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States ... to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. In Kneipp v. Tedder, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
explained that "[s]ection 1983 does not, by its 
own terms, create substantive rights; it pro-
vides only remedies for deprivations of rights 
established elsewhere in the Constitution or 
federal laws[,]" and held that "[i]n order to 
establish a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a violation of a right se-
cured by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States [and] that the alleged depriva-
tion was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d 1199, 
1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotes and cita-
tions omitted). 
Municipalities, such as Defendant AC, 
can be subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell 
v. Dept. of Soc. Sues. of City of New York, 436 
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (Local governing bodies 
... can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief 
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where ... the action that is alleged to be un-
constitutional implements or executes a 
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision officially adopted and promulgated 
by that body's officers.). "[A]lthough the 
touchstone of the § 1983 action against a 
government body is an allegation that official 
policy is responsible for a deprivation of 
rights protected by the Constitution, local 
governments, like every other § 1983 'per-
son,' by the very terms of the statute, may be 
sued for constitutional deprivations visited 
pursuant to governmental 'custom' even 
though such a custom has not received for-
mal approval through the body's official 
decisionmaking channels." Id. at 690-91. 
However, Section 1983 "did not intend mu-
nicipalities to be held liable unless action 
pursuant to official municipal policy of some 
nature caused a constitutional tort[,] [i]n 
particular, we conclude that a municipality 
cannot be held liable solely because it em-
ploys a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a mu-
nicipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 
on a respondeat superior theory." ld. at 691. 
In essence, Monell created a "two-path 
track" to municipal liability, depending on 
whether a plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is 
premised on a municipal policy or a custom. 
See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 
971 (3d Cir. 1996). In Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit provided greater clarity con-
cerning on these two sources of liability: 
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Policy is made when a 
"decisionmaker possess[ing] final 
authority to establish municipal pol-
icy with respect to the action" issues 
an official proclamation, policy, or 
edict. . . . A course of conduct is 
considered to be a "custom" when, 
though not authorized by law, "such 
practices of state officials [are] so 
permanent and well-settled" as to 
virtually constitute law. 
ld. at 1480 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Under either the policy or the custom 
track, "a plaintiff must show that an official 
who has the power to make policy is respon-
sible for either the affirmative proclamation 
of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled 
custom." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 
850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d 
at 1480); see also, Watson v. Abington 
'Iiunshp., 4 78 F. 3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007). 
In order to determine who has policymaking 
responsibility, "a court must determine 
which official has final, unreviewable discre-
tion to make a decision or take an action." 
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481. 
Doc. no. 13, pp. 8-9. 
1. Liability - Defendant DA Office 
In its prior Opinion, this Court acknowledged in 
a footnote that Defendant DA's Office had argued that 
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it was not a separate entity from Defendant AC for 
purposes of Section 1983 liability and cited caselaw in 
support of this argument. Id., pp. 10-11, n.2. The 
Court also noted that Plaintiff did not directly ad-
dress this argument and requested that ''both parties 
. . . more fully brief the specific issue of whether 
Defendant DA's Office can be subject to Section 1983 
liability." Defendant DA's office renewed this argu-
ment in its current Brief in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss (see doc. no. 18, p. 7), and Plaintiff, acknowl-
edging that Defendant DA re-raised this issue, has 
now conceded that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit has "held that local prosecutori-
al offices are not legal entities separate from the local 
governments of which they are a part ... and conse-
quently, cannot be sued under [Section] 1983." Doc. 
no. 23, p. 11, citing Briggs v. Moore, 251 Fed. Appx. 
77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007); cert. den., 553 U.S. 1057 (2008). 
Accordingly, based on the law of this Circuit, 
Defendant DA's Office cannot be sued under Section 
1983. 
2. Liability - Defendant AC 
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim may only be as-
serted against Defendant AC, the municipal entity. 
As noted above, there are two means of demonstrat-
ing the required causal link between a municipal 
"policy" and an alleged constitutional violation. First, 
a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 
49a 
officers" will suffice. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 
485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988). Second, even if a policy has 
not received approval through "official decisionmaking 
channels," customs or practices may be the basis for 
municipal liability if they are so permanent and well 
settled that they operate as law. See Kelly v. Borough 
of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Jiminez 
v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. -
2007). That is, "acquiescence in a long-standing 
practice or custom" that "constitutes the standard 
operating procedure of the local governmental entity" 
is grounds for holding a municipality liable. Jett v. 
Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 
(1989), abrogated on other grounds by statute, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1977(a). 
Applied here, Plaintiff had to set forth facts in 
his Amended Complaint to plausibly allege that 
either: (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that 
-body's officers violated his constitutional rights, or 
(2) no "policy" received approval through "official 
decisionmaking channels," but Defendant AC had 
customs or practices which were "so permanent and 
well settled" that they operated as law. 
Because Plaintiff's initial Complaint failed to 
make these requisite allegations, the Court granted 
Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss but al-
lowed Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to make the 
necessary changes to preserve his Section 1983 claim. 
See doc. no. 13, p. 6. Defendant AC now contends that 
the Amended Complaint fails to allege the necessary 
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facts to establish a plausible claim under Section 
1983. Doc. no. 19, pp. 9-11. This Court agrees. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint did set forth the 
names and positions of those who created and en-
forced the allegedly illegal custom or practice of 
Defendant AC. The Amended Complaint identified 
Dawn Botsford, Dennis Logan, and Richard Ealing as 
"top decisionmakers" within the DA's Office concern-
ing personnel and disciplinary matters, and it claims 
they were involved in terminating Plaintiff. Doc. no. 
15, 'II 12 C.-E. Plaintiff also alleged that each of these 
three individuals were employees of Defendant AC. 
I d. 
The law is clear that Defendant AC cannot be 
held liable merely because it employed the three 
. individuals whom Plaintiffhas identified. Monell, 436 
U.S at 691. There were two ways in which Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint could assert a Section 1983 
violation against Defendant AC. First, Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint could have set forth facts to 
plausibly establish that these "decisionmakers" were 
officers of Allegheny County who officially adopted 
and promulgated a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation or decision on behalf of Allegheny County 
which violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. An-
drews, 895 F.2d at 1480 and City of St. Louis 485 U.S. 
at 121. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not so 
allege. See doc. no. 15. 
Second, under Monell and its progeny, Plaintiff 
could have alleged facts to plausibly establish that 
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Defendant AC's three employees engaged in a "course 
of conduct" which came to be considered "a custom." 
Id. Plaintiff would also have had to allege that, 
although not authorized by law, the practices of the 
three "officials [were] so permanent and well-settled" 
as to virtually constitute law. Id. 
Defendant AC contends that Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint fails to make the necessary factual asser-
tions described above. In response, Plaintiff argues 
that the three AC employees (Botsford, Logan, and 
Ealing), "engaged in a campaign, [via an] unwritten 
policy/custom to 'rid the [DA's Office] and AC offices of 
older employees." Doc. no. 21, p. 9. Plaintiff claims his 
Amended Complaint alleges that this "campaign" was 
"widespread" in that younger workers were given 
overtime, as well as better work areas and vehicles. 
Id. The Court notes that Plaintiff's Brief in Opposi-
tion does not cite any paragraphs within his Amended 
Complaint pinpointing where he provides facts in 
support of these assertions. 
Moreover, the Court notes that upon its own 
review of the Amended Complaint, in sub-paragraphs 
"12. ZZ." through "12. CCC.," Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant AC (through two employees, Logan and 
Ealing) assigned overtime to "younger employees" 
and further alleges that this was done purely for 
retaliatory and discriminatory reasons despite Plain-
tiff's seniority and "right of first refusal" to accept an 
overtime assignment. Doc. no. 15, '1I 12. ZZ.-CCC. 
Plaintiff offers no further details concerning how 
frequently Plaintiff's overtime work was assigned to 
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younger employees (which would have established 
the persistence of the alleged course of conduct), nor 
does he provide any specific facts to indicate how 
many other "older" employees were subject to this 
treatment (which would have established the perva-
siveness of the alleged course of conduct). Thus, 
Plaintiff has not provided enough facts to support the 
legal conclusion that the practices of the three "offi-
cials [were] so permanent and well-settled" as to 
virtually constitute law. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed 
to plead a plausible claim under Section 1983 against 
Defendant AC given the less than adequate facts 
necessary to establish a plausible claim. The Court 
finds that the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint in this regard are largely 
conclusory in nature and thus, fail to meet the 
lqbal/Twombly standard.5 
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's Section 
1983 cannot be prosecuted against Detendant DA's 
5 In addition, although the Court has determined that 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint falls short of asserting facts 
necessary to assert a plausible claim against Defendant AC 
under Monell and its progeny, the Court also notes that Plain-
tiff's Amended Complaint fails to pinpoint with any clarity 
which of his Constitutional rights were negatively impacted by 
Defendant AC. Doc. no. 15, '11'11 30-33. The Court finds that the 
allegations made by Plaintiff claiming violations of his Four-
teenth and First Amendment rights to be conclusory in nature, 
and such assertions also fail to meet the lqbal/Twombly stan-
dard. 
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Office, because it is not an entity separate from 
Defendant AC for Section 1983 purposes, and because 
the Court finds that Plaintiff's Section 1983 allega-
tions raised against Defendant AC fall short of meet-
ing the lqbal/Twombly standard, the Court will grant 
both Defendants' Motions to Dismiss this claim. 
C. All Remaining Claims (Count II -
Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, 
and Counts IV and V - Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act Violations) 
Because Plaintiff's only remaining claims are 
state-law based claims under the Pennsylvania's 
Whistleblower Law and the PHRA, jurisdiction may 
be relinquished by this Court. The Court declines to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
state law claims. The state courts are intimately 
familiar and regularly adjudicate claims pertaining 
to the Whistleblower Law and the PHRA. According-
ly, said state law claims will be dismissed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), albeit without prejudice to 
Plaintiff's ability tore-file these claims in state court. 
Also, the dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims 
should not work to Plaintiff's disadvantage. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing for at least a thirty-day 
tolling of any applicable statute of limitation after the 
claim is dismissed so as to allow Plaintiff the neces-




Based on the foregoing law and authority, the 
Court will enter an appropriate Order consistent with 
this Opinion wherein the Court has held as follows: 
( 1) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss 
the Amended Complaint will be GRANTED, WITH 
PREJUDICE, as to: (1) Count I, Plaintiff's ADEA 
claim; and (2) Count III, Plaintiff's Section 1983 
claim for the reasons set forth above. 
(2) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss 
the Amended Complaint will be GRANTED, WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE, as to Count II (Plaintiff's Penn-
sylvania Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV and 
Count V (Plaintiff's PHRA claims), because this 
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over these remaining state law claims. Plaintiff's 
ability to re-file these claims in state court will not 
impaired by this dismissal, as 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) 
provides for at least a thirty-day tolling of any appli-
cable statute of limitation after the claim is dis-
missed. 
s/ Arthur J. Schwab 
Arthur J. Schwab 
United States District Judge 
cc: All Registered ECF Counsel 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 














(Filed Jan. 4, 2013) 
AND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2013, for the 
reasons discussed in the Court's Memorandum Opin-
ion filed contemporaneously with this Order, and 
based up on the law and authority cited therein, 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (doc. nos. 16 and 17) 
will be GRANTED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, 
WITH PREJUDICE, as to Count I, Plaintiff's ADEA 
claim and Count III, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. 
2. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as to Count II (Plaintiff's 
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV 
and Count V (Plaintiff's PHRA claims), because this 
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Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over these remaining state law claims. 
s/ Arthur J. Schwab 
Arthur J. Schwab 
United States District Judge 
cc: All Registered ECF Counsel 
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2012 WL 6093798 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. Pennsylvania. 
Anthony HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Allegheny County 
District Attorney's Office, Defendants. 
No. 12cv1122. I Dec. 7, 2012. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
ARTHUR J. SCHWAB, District Judge. 
Before the Court are two separate Motions to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant Allegheny 
County (" AC") has filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint in its entirety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 
while Defendant Allegheny County District Attorney's 
Office ("DA's Office") filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss 
(seeking dismissal of Counts II, III and IV) under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). See doc 
nos. 7 and 5, respectively. Plaintiff filed a Brief in 
Opposition to each Motion to Dismiss. See doc. nos. 12 
and 9, respectively. 
The matters are now ripe for adjudication. 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Motions Filed Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6) 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal 
courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the 
heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 
8(a)(2) requires only "'a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of 
what the . . . claim is and the grounds on which it 
rests."' Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957)). 
Building upon the landmark United States 
Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that a Dis-
trict Court must undertake the following three steps 
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: 
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the ele-
ments a plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim." Second, the court should identify al-
legations that, "because they are no more 
than conclusions, are not entitled to the as-
sumption of truth." Third, "whe[n] there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 
should assume their veracity and then de-
termine whether they plausibly give rise to 
an entitlement for relief." This means that 
our inquiry is normally broken into three 
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the 
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claim, (2) reviewing the Complaint to strike 
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking 
at the well-pleaded components of the Com-
plaint and evaluating whether all of the ele-
ments identified in part one of the inquiry 
are sufficiently alleged. 
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.2011) 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). 
The third step of the sequential evaluation 
requires this Court to consider the specific nature of 
the claims presented and to determine whether the 
facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to 
show a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 
210. "While legal conclusions can provide the frame-
work of a Complaint, they must be supported by 
factual allegations." Id. at 210-11; see also Malleus, 
641 F.3d at 560. 
This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely 
because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plain-
tiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately 
prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8. 
Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts al-
leged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 
556. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides 
adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where" 
will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 
212; see also Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 
346 F. App'x. 774, 776 (3d Cir.2009). 
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In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be 
granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if estab-
lished at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 563 n. 8. 
B. The Motion Filed Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(f) 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a 
party to seek to have stricken from any pleading "an 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent or scandalous matter." 
II. DISCUSSION - DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS1 
A. Count I -Age Discrimination ("ADEA") 
A party seeking relief for employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII must first establish that he 
timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), that he received 
a right to sue letter, and that he filed his Complaint 
m Federal Court within ninety days of a [sic] his 
1 Because the Court writes primarily for the parties who 
are familiar with the details of this case, and because the Court 
accepts all well-pled facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint as 
true for purposes of deciding these Motions to Dismiss, the 
Court has declined to provide a separate recitation of the 
relevant facts as pled by Plaintiff. To the extent the Court found 
that the recitation of ay [sic] of the facts was necessary, those 
facts have been set forth within the individual sub-parts of the 
"Discussion" section herein. 
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receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the 
EEOC. See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough 
of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.2001). The 
ADEA requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimi-
nation with the EEOC within three hundred days of 
the alleged discriminatory act. 
Defendant AC argues that Count I of the Com-
plaint - Plaintiff's ADEA claim under Title VII -
should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies prior to filing this 
lawsuit. Plaintiff counters by arguing that his Com-
plaint, specifically paragraph three, alleges enough 
factual information under the lqbal/Twombly stan-
dard to survive this Motion to Dismiss. 
Paragraph three of the Complaint reads as 
follows: 
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under 
section 706 of Title VII,· have occurred or 
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim of 
employment discrimination with the [EEOC]. 
The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue. 
The Complaint is filed within 90 days of such 
Notice of Right to Sue. 
Doc. no. 1, Cj[ 3. A copy of the Right to Sue letter was 
not attached to the Complaint. 
Because paragraph three and the remainder of 
the Complaint fails to provide any facts, i.e. specific 
dates, as to when Plaintiff raised his claim with the 
EEOC and when the EEOC issued its right to sue 
letter to Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff failed to 
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attach his Right to Sue to the Complaint, this Court 
is constrained to concur with Defendant AC that the 
Complaint falls short of providing the facts to estab-
lish whether he has adequately exhausted his admin-
istrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court will grant 
Defendant AC's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the 
Complaint, but will do so without prejudice to allow 
Plaintiff time to file an Amended Complaint estab-
lishing the factual basis to support the legal conclu-
sion that he has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
B. Count II - Pennsylvania's Whistle-
blower Law 
The pertinent sections of Pennsylvania's Whis-
tleblower Law read as follows: 
(a) Persons not to be discharged.-No em-
ployer may discharge, threaten or otherwise 
discriminate or retaliate against an employ-
ee regarding the employee's compensation, 
terms, conditions, location or privileges of 
employment because the employee or a per-
son acting on behalf of the employee makes a 
good faith report or is about to report, verbal-
ly or in writing, to the employer or appropri-
ate authority an instance of wrongdoing or 
waste. 
(b) Discrimination prohibited.-No employer 
may discharge, threaten or otherwise dis-
criminate or retaliate against an employee 
regarding the employee's compensation, 
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terms, conditions, location or privileges of 
employment because the employee is re-
quested by an appropriate authority to par-
ticipate in an investigation, hearing or 
inquiry held by an appropriate authority or 
in a court action. 
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1423. 
The following words and phrases when used 
in this act shall have the meanings given to 
them in this section unless the context clear-
ly indicates otherwise: 
* * * 
"Good faith report." A report of conduct de-
fined in this act as wrongdoing or waste 
which is made without malice or considera-
tion of personal benefit and which the person 
making the report has reasonable cause to 
believe is true. 
* * * 
"Whistleblower." A person who witnesses or 
has evidence of wrongdoing or waste while 
employed and who makes a good faith report 
of the wrongdoing or waste, verbally or in 
writing,- to one of the person's superiors, to 
an agent of the employer or to an appropri-
ate authority. 
"Wrongdoing." A violation which is not of 
a merely technical or minimal nature of 
a Federal or State statute or regulation, 
of a political subdivision ordinance or 
regulation or of a code of conduct or 
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ethics designed to protect the interest of 
the public or the employer. 
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1422. 
Each of the Defendants contend that Plaintiff's 
Complaint fails to adequately assert a cause of action 
for violation of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, 43 
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1421 et seq. However, each Defendant 
has a slightly different basis for their respective 
position. 
Defendant AC suggests that Plaintiff's Com-
plaint fails to allege facts which establish "wrongdo-
ing'' and/or "good faith report" within the meaning of 
the Whistleblower Law. 
Defendant DA's Office contends that: (1) the facts 
alleged by Plaintiff in support of the "wrongdoing'' 
prong of the Whistleblower Law do not constitute 
"wrongdoing" as that term is defined; (2) the Com-
plaint itself demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to 
make a "good faith report" within the meaning of the 
Whistleblower Law; and (3) Plaintiff failed to assert 
the causal connection between his whistleblowing and 
his termination. 
In response to the arguments made by both 
Defendants, Plaintiff contends that paragraph 11, at 
subparagraphs H-I, L, S-Y, and DDD ofhis Complaint 
provide the requisite facts necessary to support a 
plausible claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower 
Law. 
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This Court does not entirely agree with either 
Plaintiff or Defendants. 
First, this Court acknowledges that the Whistle-
blower Law's definition of "wrongdoing'' encompasses 
more than technical violation of a Federal or State 
statute. It can also encompass a violation of a regula-
tion, a code of conduct, or ethics "designed to protect 
the interest of the public or the employer." Although a 
violation can be inferred, generally, from the allega-
tions set forth in paragraph 11 of the Complaint 
(when read as a whole), the law under Iqbal and 
Twombly requires more than that. To be in compli-
ance with Iqbal, Plaintiff's Complaint needs to defini-
tively state what statute, regulation, code of conduct, 
or ethics code was violated by one or both Defendants. 
Second, Plaintiff's Complaint falls short of clear-
ly drawing the causal connection between the alleged 
good faith report of the alleged wrongdoing and the 
Defendants' alleged reprisal. Although it can be 
inferred that the alleged good faith reports preceded 
the alleged reprisal, the Complaint is not clear on this 
point, and precision and clarity are required by the 
Iqbal/Twombly standard. 
Finally, because the "good faith" component of 
the Whistleblower Law is driven, in part, by the 
definition of wrongdoing, it is premature to determine 
whether Plaintiff's allegations that he made alleged 
"good faith" reports of wrongdoing are sufficient 
under Iqbal!Twombly. For all of these reasons, the 
Court will grant the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
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Count II of the Complaint, but will do so without 
prejudice to allow Plaintiff time to file an Amended 
Complaint. 
C. Count III - Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act: Retaliation 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit has recently summarized the body of law 
surrounding Title VII as follows: 
Title VII prohibits discriminatory employ-
ment practices based upon an individual's 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff carries the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case. See McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. u. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 
36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie 
case, a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) 
he belongs to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for 
the position; 3) he was subject to an adverse employ-
ment action; and 4) the adverse action was under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation. Sarullo u. U.S. Postal Seru., 352 F.3d 789, 797 
(3d Cir.2003). A defendant can rebut the claim by 
presenting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for the employment action. Id. The plaintiff must 
then "establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the employer's proffered reasons were merely a 
pretext for discrimination." Id. 
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Young v. School Dist. of Philadelphia 427 
Fed.Appx. 150, 153 (3d Cir.2011). 
In their Briefs in Support of Dismissal, both 
Defendants correctly noted that Title VII applies to 
those individuals who believe they suffered some 
form of discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. Doc. No. 8, p. 5, and Doc. No. 6, p. 
3. Both Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not 
allege any discriminatory acts on the part of either 
Defendant predicated upon Plaintiff's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Plaintiff conceded 
in one of his Briefs in Opposition that he incorrectly 
asserted his retaliation claim under Title VII. Doc. 
No. 10, p. 9. 
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation claim predi-
cated upon Title VII. 
D. Count IV - First and Fourteenth 
Amendments: Equal Protection 
Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 states 
that, "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
In Kneipp v. Tedder, the United States Court of 
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Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that "[s]ection 
1983 does not, by its own terms, create substantive 
rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of 
rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or 
federal laws[,]" and held that "[i]n order to establish a 
section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a 
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged 
deprivation was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d 
Cir.1996) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
Municipalities, such as Defendant AC, can be 
subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. 
Sues. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) 
(Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly 
under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive 
relief where ... the action that is alleged to be uncon-
stitutional implements or executes a policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 
adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.). 
"[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action 
against a government body is an allegation that 
official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights 
protected by the Constitution, local governments, like 
every other § 1983 'person,' by the very terms of the 
statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations 
visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even 
though such a custom has not received formal ap-
proval through the body's official decisionmaking 
channels." Id. at 690-91. However, Section 1983 "did 
not intend municipalities to be held liable unless 
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action pursuant to official municipal policy of some 
nature caused a constitutional tort[,][i]n particular, 
we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable 
solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other 
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under 
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691. 
In essence, Monell created a "two-path track" to 
municipal liability, depending on whether a plaintiff's 
Section 1983 claim is premised on a municipal policy 
or a custom. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 
966, 971 (3d Cir.1996). In Andrews v. City of Phila-
delphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir.1990), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided 
greater clarity concerning on these two sources of 
liability: 
Policy is made when a "decisionmaker pos-
sess[ing] final authority to establish munici-
pal policy with respect to the action" issues 
an official proclamation, policy, or edict .... A 
course of conduct is considered to be a "cus-
tom" when, though not authorized by law, 
"such practices of state officials [are] so per-
manent and well-settled" as to virtually con-
stitute law. 
Id. at 1480 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Under either the policy or the custom track, "a 
plaintiff must show that an official who has the power 
to make policy is responsible for either the affirma-
tive proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a 
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well-settled custom." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 
845, 850 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 
1480); see also, Watson v. Abington Twnshp., 4 78 F.3d 
144, 156 (3d Cir.2007). In order to determine who has 
policymaking responsibility, "a court must determine 
which official has final, unreviewable discretion to 
make a decision or take an action." Andrews, 895 F.2d 
at 1481. 
Here, both Defendants argue that the Complaint 
fails to allege facts which could support either theory 
- i.e., that a policy or a custom was in place which 
violated Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Defendant DA's Office also contends that it is 
not a "person" under Section 1983, and further argues 
that Plaintiff failed to allege a causal connection 
between his termination and his exercise of his First 
Amendment rights. 
In his Briefs in Opposition to the Defendants' 
respective Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff relies on the 
allegations found in paragraph eleven to support his 
contention that he has adequately identified a policy 
or custom which violated Plaintiffs' First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. Doc. No. 10, p. 11 and Doc. 
No. 12, p. 10. Plaintiff's Complaint contains an 
allegation whereby various, specifically-identified 
individuals, one of whom is classified as Plaintiff's 
"direct supervisor," "began an official campaign to rid 
the [Defendants'] offices of older employees .... " Doc. 
No. 1, 'fi11(B). Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges that 
Plaintiff's direct supervisor and one other specifical-
ly-identified individual failed to provide him with 
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overtime and "better" work space and automobiles 
due to his age and made "public comments in the 
office about needing to get rid of the older employees." 
Doc. No. 1, «Jl«Jl ll(FF)-(II). However, the Complaint 
fails to allege or identify a specific policy the name of 
the person who terminated Plaintiff's employment. 
See Doc. No. 1, «Jl 10, ("On February 18, 2011, the 
[Defendants] terminated [Plaintiff's] employment."). 
Moreover, nowhere in his Complaint does Plain-
tiff allege that either of these individuals are 
"decisionmakers" with the final authority to establish 
a policy. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege which of 
these individuals (if either of them) had the power to 
acquiesce to the alleged well-settled custom of dis-
criminating against older employees. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that the Complaint is deficient with 
regard to his Section 1983 claim, and will grant both 
of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, without preju-
dice, in this regard.2 
2 The Court acknowledges Defendant DA Office's argument 
that it is not a separate entity from Defendant County and thus, 
not a separate entity subject to Section 1983 liability. In support 
of this position, Defendant DA's Office cited caselaw. The Court 
notes that Plaintiff did not directly address this argument nor 
the caselaw cited in his Brief in Opposition. If Plaintiff chooses 
to file an Amended Complaint and continues to assert the 
Section 1983 claim against Defendant DA's Office, and if De-
fendant DA's Office files a Motion to Dismiss the Section 1983 
claim from the Amended Complaint, the Court would urge both 
parties to more fully brief the specific issue of whether Defen-
dant DA's Office can be subject to Section 1983 liability. At this 
point in time, the Court declines to rule on the issue of whether 
(Continued on following page) 
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E. Counts V and VI - Pennsylvania Hu-
man Relations Act Violations 
Defendant AC was the only Defendant to file a 
Motion to Dismiss Counts V and VI of the Complaint, 
both of which allege that Plaintiff's rights under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") were 
violated. Defendant AC notes that nowhere in either 
of these two Counts does the Plaintiff assert any 
allegations against Defendant AC. 
Plaintiff concurs that Counts V and VI "inadvert-
ently refer to only [Defendant DA's Office] and not 
[Defendant AC]." Doc. No. 12, p. 12. However, Plain-
tiff argues that by incorporating all prior averments 
he has preserved his PHRA claims against Defendant 
AC.ld. 
The Court will grant Defendant AC's Motion to 
Dismiss these two Counts, without prejudice, thereby 
allowing Plaintiff time to amend his pleading in this 
regard should he choose to do so. 
F. Punitive Damages 
Both Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover punitive damages under the 
ADEA, Title VII, or Pennsylvania's Whistleblower 
Defendant DA's Office is an entity subject to Section 1983 
liability, due to the fact that it has decided that Plaintiff's 
Complaint currently lacks enough factual information to sustain 
a plausible cause of action against either Defendant. 
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Law. In addition, both Defendants claim they are 
immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.3 
Plaintiff concedes the following: (1) punitive 
damages are unavailable to him under Pennsylva-
nia's Whistleblower Law; (2) Defendants are immune 
from punitive damages under Section 1983; and (3) 
he has no viable Title VII claim. Doc. No. 10, pg. 9 
and Doc. no. 12, p. 13. Given these concessions, 
Plaintiff's recovery of any punitive damage award 
against either Defendant would be limited to his 
ADEAclaim. 
In this regard, Plaintiff concedes that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not 
ruled on whether punitive damages are available 
under the ADEA. Thus, this Court may obtain guid-
ance from other courts within the Third Circuit and 
the body of case law on this issue from other Circuits. 
Recently, in Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2011 WL 
3607458,-(W.D .Pa. August 16, 2011), Judge McVerry 
noted the following when granting U.S. Steel's Motion 
to Dismiss Kelly's punitive damages from his ADEA 
claim: 
3 Plaintiff did not seek punitive damages under his PHRA 
claims, presumably because such damages are unavailable 
under the PHRA. See, Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 749 
(Pa.l998) (''While punitive damages also serve to deter, simply 
put, we do not consider punitive damages to be consistent with 
the remedial nature of the Act."). 
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Defendant likewise contends that Kelly may 
not recover punitive damages under the 
ADEA. Although the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit has not ad-
dressed this issue, all of the courts of appeals 
which have done so have denied claims for 
punitive damages in ADEA cases. See Bruno 
v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966-67 
(lOth Cir.1987) (collecting cases from other 
circuits). Several members of this Court and 
a number of our sister courts within the 
Third Circuit have denied claims for punitive 
damages under the ADEA as well. See, e.g., 
Zurik v. Woodruff Family Services, 2009 WL 
4348826, at *1 (2009 W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009); 
Baldwin v. Peake, 2009 WL 1911040, at *3 
(2009 W.D. Pa. July 1, 2009); Steward v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 F.Supp.2d 719, 730 
(E.D.Pa.2004). The Court finds those deci-
sions persuasive and agrees that the ADEA 
does not authorize claims for punitive dam-
ages. 
Kelly at *3. 
Based on Plaintiff's concessions, coupled with 
this Court's Opinion that punitive damages are not 
available to Plaintiff under the ADEA, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff may not pursue punitive damages 
against either Defendant. Accordingly, Defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss punitive damages from this case 
will be granted. 
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F. Compensatory Damages 
Both Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes, 
that Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages 
for pain, suffering, humiliation, emotional distress, 
and anxiety under the ADEA. See Watcher v. Potts-
ville Area Emerg. Med. Sues., Inc., 248 Fed.Appx. 272, 
277 (3d Cir.2007) (a plaintiff cannot recover liquidat-
ed damages for pain and suffering under the ADEA), 
citing Rodriguez v.. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d 
Cir.1977). See also Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engi-
neering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir.1977) (" ... 
we hold that damages for 'pain and suffering' or 
emotional distress cannot properly be awarded in 
ADEA cases."). 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' claim for compensatory damages pursuant 
to the ADEA will be granted. 
III. DISCUSSION - DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE 
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(0. 
As two Courts in this district have noted: 
The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean 
up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and 
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial 
matters." Natale v. Winthrop Resources Corp., 
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Civil Action No. 07-4686, 2008 WL 2758238 
at *14 (E.D.Pa. July 9, 2008) (quoting 
Mcinerney v. Moyer Lumber and Hardware, 
Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402 (E.D.Pa.2002). 
While "[a] court possesses considerable dis-
cretion in disposing of a motion to strike un-
der Rule 12(0," such motions are "not 
favored and usually will be denied unless the 
allegations have no possible relation to the 
controversy and may cause prejudice to one 
of the parties, or if the allegations confuse 
the issues in the case." Id. (quoting River 
Road Deuel. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., Civ. A. 
No. 89-7037,1990 WL 69085, at *2 (E.D.Pa. 
May 23, 1990). Striking some or all of a 
pleading is therefore considered a "drastic 
remedy to be resorted to only when required 
for the purposes of justice." I d. (quoting DeLa 
Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 
(E.D.Pa.2007) (quotations omitted). 
See Thornton v. UL Enterprises, 2010 WL 1004998, at 
*1 (W.D.Pa. March 16, 2010) (Cohill, J.), quoting 
Adams v. County of Erie, Pa., 2009 WL 4016636, at *1 
(W.D.Pa. Nov, 19, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.). 
Turning to the facts of this case, Defendant DA's 
office contends that paragraph 11, subparagraphs 
(ZZ) through (CCC) should be stricken because they 
do not contain information pertinent to any of the 
claims alleged by Plaintiff. These paragraphs read as 
follows: 
ZZ. In early January 2010, Hildebrand over-
heard a conversation between ADA Claus 
77a 
and Investigator Graber where Claus made 
incriminating statements concerning the 
Senator Jane Orie case. Claus and Graber 
knew Hildebrand overheard this conversation 
because they got quiet after they first saw 
Hildebrand and moved away from him. 
AAA. In December, 2009 an informal memo 
was issued by DAs office that any and all po-
litical files on DA's computers were to be 
a [sic] erased. Hildebrand spoke with ADA 
Darryl Parker who advised Hildebrand he 
was ordered by Zappala personally to come 
in on December 24, 2009 to delete his politi-
cal files by the DA himself. It is believed and 
averred this action was taken in response to 
a freedom of information request filed by 
Jane Orie's attorney seeking to have all polit-
ical files on the district attorney's office com-
puters be produced under the freedom of 
information act. 
BBB. In January 2010 the DA computers 
were to be sanitized from political references 
by outside consultant, Fran Zovko. This was 
done to double check and make sure all polit-
ical files contained on the DA's computers 
would be removed before Ms. Botsford re-
sponded to the freedom of information re-
quest made by Jane Orie or her attorneys. 
CCC. Darryl Parker advised Hildebrand he 
complained to Dawn Botsford that the DA's 
practice of wiping clean political references 
from computers was an obstruction of justice 
and was wrong and should not be done. Darryl 
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Parker was advised to keep his mouth shut 
and just do as he was told. Hildebrand had 
no political files on his computer and did not 
need to comply with the D.Ns request. 
Doc. No. 1, 'II ll(ZZ)-(CCC). 
In response to Defendant DA Office's argument, 
Plaintiff contends that once his contributions to the 
Orie family became known to his superiors in the 
workplace the harassment and discrimination against 
him intensified. See Doc. No. 10, p. 15. Plaintiff 
claims the averments found in subparagraphs 1 l(ZZ) 
through (CCC) bear "reasonable relations" to support 
Plaintiff's First Amendment and Whistleblower 
claims. Doc. No. 10, p. 15. However, aside from mak-
ing this blanket statement, Plaintiff's Brief in Oppo-
sition to Defendant DA Office's Motion to Strike fails 
to provide any clear explanation of how the allega-
tions found in these four subparagraphs support his 
First Amendment or his Pennsylvania Whistleblower 
Law claim. 
The Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges that Defendants hired Plaintiff in 2005 to 
work as a detective for the Allegheny County District 
Attorney's Investigation Unit. Doc. No. 1, 'II 9. Plain-
tiff claims that starting in 2009, Defendants "began 
an official campaign to rid [Defendants'] offices of 
older employees .... " Id. 'II ll(B). The majority of the 
remaining subparagraphs to paragraph 11 of Plain-
tiff's Complaint provide additional details and allega-
tions concerning what Defendants did and did not do 
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to "rid [Defendants'] offices of older employees[,]" and 
Plaintiff in particular. See CJI ll(C)-(YY). 
Recalling that the purpose of a motion to strike is 
to "clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and 
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters," 
and while this Court is (generally) not inclined to 
grant a Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f), facts pled 
here in subparagraphs ll(ZZ) through ll(CCC) appear 
to have no relation to the controversy. In addition, the 
Court finds that these allegations may cause preju-
dice to Defendant DA's Office and confuse the over-
arching issues and claims presented by Plaintiff in 
the case. 
For these reasons, the Court will grant Defend-
ant DA Office's Motion to Strike subparagraphs 
ll(ZZ) through (CCC). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing law and authority, the 
Court will enter an appropriate Order consistent with 
this Opinion wherein the Court has held as follows: 
(1) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss will be 
GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to: (1) Count III, 
Plaintiff's Title VII Claim; (2) Plaintiff's demand for 
a punitive damage award; and (3) Plaintiff's demand 
for compensatory damages under the ADEA. 
(2) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss 
will be GRANTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to 
Count I (Plaintiff's ADEA claim), Count II (Plaintiff's 
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Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV 
(Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim) and Counts V and VI 
(Plaintiff's PHRA claims) of the Complaint. 
(3) Defendant DA's Office Motion to Strike 
subparagraphs ll(ZZ) through (CCC) will also be 
GRANTED. 
81a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action 
for deprivation of rights 
Effective: October 19, 1996 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immun-
ities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any actiori brought against a judicial officer 
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless 
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any 
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District 
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings 
in vindication of civil rights 
Effective: September 22, 2000 
(a) Applicability of statutory and common law 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters con-
ferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 
13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protec-
tion of all persons in the United States in their civil 
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rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised 
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the 
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to 
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they 
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the 
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and 
punish offenses against law, the common law, as mod-
ified and changed by the constitution and statutes of 
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of 
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same 
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, shall be extended to and govern 
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the 
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the inflic-
tion of punishment on the party found guilty. 
(b) Attorney's fees 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of 
this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 [ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
[ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or 
section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailin~ party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 
costs, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held 
liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless 
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such action was clearly in excess of such officer's 
jurisdiction. 
(c) Expert fees 
In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of 
this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the 
court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as 
part of the attorney's fee. 
29 U.S.C. § 211. Collection of data 
(a) Investigations and inspections 
The Administrator or his designated representa-
tives may investigate and gather data regarding the 
wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of 
employment in any industry subject to this chapter, 
and may enter and inspect such places and such rec-
ords (and make such transcriptions thereof), question 
such employees, and investigate such facts, condi-
tions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary 
or appropriate to determine whether any person has 
violated any provision of this chapter, or which may 
aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chap-
ter. Except as provided in section 212 of this title and 
in subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator 
shall utilize the bureaus and divisions of the Depart-
ment of Labor for all the investigations and inspec-
tions necessary under this section. Except as provided 
in section 212 of this title, the Administrator shall 
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bring all actions under section 217 of this title to 
restrain violations of this chapter. 
(b) State and local agencies and employees 
With the consent and cooperation of State agencies 
charged with the administration of State labor laws, 
the Administrator and the Secretary of Labor may, for 
the purpose of carrying out their respective functions 
and duties under this chapter, utilize the services of 
State and local agencies and their employees and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, may re-
imburse such State and local agencies and their em-
ployees for services rendered for such purposes. 
(c) Records 
Every employer subject to any provision of this chap-
ter or of any order issued under this chapter shall 
make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons 
employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other 
conditions and practices of employment maintained 
by him, and shall preserve such records for such 
periods of time, and shall make such reports there-
from to the Administrator as he shall prescribe by 
regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for 
the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter or 
the regulations or orders thereunder. The employer of 
an employee who performs substitute work described 
in section 207(p)(3) of this title may not be required 
under this subsection to keep a record of the hours of 
the substitute work. 
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(d) Homework regulations 
The Administrator is authorized to make such regula-
tions and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting 
industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate 
to prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to 
safeguard the minimum wage rate prescribed in this 
chapter, and all existing regulations or orders of the 
Administrator relating to industrial homework are 
continued in full force and effect. 
29 U.S.C. § 216. Penalties 
Effective: May 21, 2008 
(a) Fines and imprisonment 
Any person who willfully violates any of the provi-
sions of section 215 of this title shall upon conviction 
thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, 
or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or 
both. No person shall be imprisoned under this sub-
section except for an offense committed after the con-
viction of such person for a prior offense under this 
subsection. 
(b) Damages; right of action; attorney's fees and 
costs; termination of right of action 
Any employer who violates the provisions of sec-
tion 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to 
the employee or employees affected in the amount of 
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid over-
time compensation, as the case may be, and in an 
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additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any 
employer who violates the provisions of section 
215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or 
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate 
the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, includ-
ing without limitation employment, reinstatement, 
promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an ad-
ditional equal amount as liquidated damages. An ac-
tion to recover the liability prescribed in either of the 
preceding sentences may be maintained against any 
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal 
or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or 
more employees for and in behalf of himself or them-
selves and other employees similarly situated. No 
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such 
a party and such consent is filed in the court in which 
such action is brought. The court in such action shall, 
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
paid by the defendant, and costs of the action. The 
right provided by this subsection to bring an action by 
or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any 
employee to become a party plaintiff to any such ac-
tion, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by 
the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217 
of this title in which (1) restraint is sought of any 
further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum 
wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensa-
tion, as the case may be, owing to such employee un-
der section 206 or section 207 of this title by an 
employer liable therefor under the provisions of this 
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subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as 
a result of alleged violations of section 215(a)(3) of 
this title. 
(c) Payment of wages and compensation; waiver of 
claims; actions by the Secretary; limitation of actions 
The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment 
of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime 
compensation owing to any employee or employees 
under section 206 or section 207 of this title, and the 
agreement of any employee to accept such payment 
shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by 
such employee of any right he may have under sub-
section (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum 
wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages. The Sec-
retary may bring an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid mini-
mum wages or overtime compensation and an equal 
amount as liquidated damages. The right provided by 
subsection (b) of this section to bring an action by 
or on behalf of any employee to recover the liability 
specified in the first sentence of such subsection and 
of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any 
such action shall terminate upon the filing of a com-
plaint by the Secretary in an action under this sub-
section in which a recovery is sought of unpaid 
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation 
under sections 206 and 207 of this title or liquidated 
or other damages provided by this subsection owing 
to such employee by an employer liable under the 
provisions of subsection (b) of this section, unless 
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such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion 
of the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by the 
Secretary of Labor on behalf of an employee pursuant 
to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit 
account and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary of 
Labor, directly to the employee or employees affected. 
Any such sums not paid to an employee because of 
inability to do so within a period of three years shall 
be covered into the Treasury of the United States as 
miscellaneous receipts. In determining when an 
action is commenced by the Secretary of Labor under 
this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of 
limitations provided in section 255(a) of this title, it 
shall be considered to be commenced in the case of 
any individual claimant on the date when the com-
plaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party 
plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did not so 
appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is 
added as a party plaintiff in such action. 
(d) Savings provi&ions 
In any action or proceeding commenced prior to, on, 
or after August 8, 1956, no employer shall be subject 
to any liability or punishment under this chapter 
or the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29 U.S.C.A. § 251 
et seq.] on account of his failure to comply with any 
-provision or provisions of this chapter or such Act 
( 1) with respect to work heretofore or hereafter per-
formed in a workplace to which the exemption in sec-
tion 213(f) of this title is applicable, (2) with respect 
to work performed in Guam, the Canal Zone or Wake 
Island before the effective date of this amendment of 
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subsection (d), or (3) with respect to work performed 
in a possession named in section 206(a)(3) of this title 
at any time prior to the establishment by the Secre-
tary, as provided therein, of a minimum wage rate 
applicable to such work. 
(e)(l)(A) Any person who violates the provisions 
of sections 212 or 213(c) of this title, relating to child 
labor, or any regulation issued pursuant to such 
sections, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to 
exceed-
(i) $11,000 for each employee who was the sub-
ject of such a violation; or 
(ii) $50,000 with regard to each such violation 
that causes the death or serious injury of any 
employee under the age of 18 years, which pen-
alty may be doubled where the violation is a re-
peated or willful violation. 
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term 
"serious injury" means -
(i) permanent loss or substantial impairment of 
one of the senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, 
tactile sensation); 
(ii) permanent loss or substantial impairment 
of the function of a bodily member, organ, or 
mental faculty, including the loss of all or part of 
an arm, leg, foot, hand or other body part; or 
(iii) permanent paralysis or substantial impair-
ment that causes loss of movement or mobility of 
an arm, leg, foot, hand or other body part. 
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(2) Any person who repeatedly or willfully violates 
section 206 or 207, relating to wages, shall be subject 
to a civil penalty not to exceed $1,100 for each such 
violation. 
(3) In determining the amount of any penalty under 
this subsection, the appropriateness of such penalty 
to the size of the business of the person charged and 
the gravity of the violation shall be considered. The 
amount of any penalty under this subsection, when 
finally determined, may be -
(A) deducted from any sums owing by the United 
States to the person charged; 
(B) recovered in a civil action brought by the Secre-
tary in any court of competent jurisdiction, in which 
litigation the Secretary shall be represented by the 
Solicitor of Labor; or 
(C) ordered by the court, in an action brought for a 
violation of section 215(a)( 4) of this title or a repeated 
or willful violation of section 215(a)(2) of this title, to 
be paid to the Secretary. 
(4) Any administrative determination by the Secre-
tary of the amount of any penalty under this subsec-
tion shall be final, unless within 15 days after receipt 
of notice thereof by certified mail the person charged 
with the violation takes exception to the determina-
tion that the violations for which the penalty is im-
posed occurred, in which event final determination of 
the penalty shall be made in an administrative pro-
ceeding after opportunity for hearing in accordance 
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with section 554 of Title 5, and regulations to be 
promulgated by the Secretary. 
(5) Except for civil penalties collected for violations 
of section 212 of this title, sums collected as penalties 
pursuant to this section shall be applied toward re-
imbursement of the costs of determining the viola-
tions and assessing and collecting such penalties, in 
accordance with the provision of section 9a of this 
title. Civil penalties collected for violations of section 
212 of this title shall be deposited in the general fund 
of the Treasury. 
29 U.S.C. § 217. Injunction proceedings 
The district courts, together with the United States 
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the District 
Court of Guam shall have jurisdiction, for cause 
shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this 
·title, including in the case of violations of section 
215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding 
of payment of minimum wages or overtime compen-
sation found by the court to be due to employees 
under this chapter (except sums which employees are 
barred from recovering, at the time of the commence-
ment of the action to restrain the violations, by virtue 
of the provisions of section 255 of this title). 
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29 U.S.C. § 623. Prohibition of age discrimination 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in 
order to comply with this chapter. 
(b) Employment agency practices 
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail 
or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of such in-
dividual's age, or to classify or refer for employment 
any individual on the basis of such individual's age. 
(c) Labor organization practices 
It shallbe unlawful for a labor organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, 
or otherwise to discriminate against, any indi-
vidual because of his age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its member-
ship, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for 
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employment any individual, in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities, or would limit such 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee or as an appli-
cant for employment, because of such individual's 
age; 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an individual in violation of 
this section. 
(d) Opposition to unlawful practices; participation in 
investigations, proceedings, or litigation 
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for em-
ployment, for an employment agency to discriminate 
against any individual, or for a labor organization to 
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant 
for membership, because such individual, member or 
applicant for membership has opposed any practice 
made unlawful by this section, or because such in-
dividual, member or applicant for membership has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litiga-
tion under this chapter. 
(e) Printing or publication of notice or advertise-
ment indicating preference, limitation, etc. 
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organiza-
tion, or employment agency to print or publish, or 
cause to be printed or published, any notice or adver-
tisement relating to employment by such an employer 
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or membership in or any classification or referral for 
employment by such a labor organization, or relating 
to any classification or referral for employment by 
such an employment agency, indicating any prefer-
ence, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based 
on age. 
(f) Lawful practices; age an occupational qualifi-
cation; other reasonable factors; laws of foreign 
workplace; seniority system; employee benefit plans; 
discharge or discipline for good cause 
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment 
agency, or labor organization -
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited un-
der subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section 
where age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of the particular business, or where the differen-
tiation is based on reasonable factors other than 
age, or where such practices involve an employee 
in a workplace in a foreign country, and compli-
ance with such subsections would cause such 
employer, or a corporation controlled by such em-
ployer, to violate the laws of the country in which 
such workplace is located; 
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited un-
der subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section-
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide sen-
iority system that is not intended to evade 
the purposes of this chapter, except that no 
such seniority system shall require or permit 
the involuntary retirement of any individual 
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specified by section 631(a) of this title be-
cause of the age of such individual; or 
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan -
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit 
package, the actual amount of payment 
made or cost incurred on behalf of an 
older worker is no less than that made or 
incurred on behalf of a younger worker, as 
permissible under section 1625.10, title 
29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in ef-
fect on June 22, 1989); or 
(ii) that is a voluntary early retire-
ment incentive plan consistent with the 
relevant purpose or purposes of this 
chapter. 
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subpara-
graph (B), no such employee benefit plan or 
voluntary early retirement incentive plan 
shall excuse the failure to hire any individu-
al, and no such employee benefit plan shall 
require or permit the involuntary retirement 
of any individual specified by section 631(a) 
of this title, because of the age of such in-
dividual. An employer, employment agency, 
or labor organization acting under subpara-
graph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii) of sub-
paragraph (B), shall have the burden of 
proving that such actions are lawful in any 
civil enforcement proceeding brought under 
this chapter; or 
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(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individ-
ual for good cause. 
(g) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-239, Title VI,§ 6202(b)(3)(C)(i), 
Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2233 
(h) Practices of foreign corporations controlled by 
American employers; foreign employers not controlled 
by American employers; factors determining control 
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose 
place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any 
practice by such corporation prohibited under this 
section shall be presumed to be such practice by such 
employer. 
(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply 
where the employer is a foreign person not controlled 
by an American employer. 
(3) For the purpose of this subsection the determi-
nation of whether an employer controls a corporation 
shall be based upon the-
(A) interrelation of operations, 
(B) common management, 
(C) ~entralized control of labor relations, and 
(D) common ownership or financial control, 
of the employer and the corporation. 
(i) Employee pension benefit plans; cessation or re-
duction of benefit accrual or of allocation to employee 
account; distribution of benefits after attainment of 
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normal retirement age; compliance; highly compen-
sated employees 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
it shall be unlawful for an employer, an employment 
agency, a labor organization, or any combination 
thereof to establish or maintain an employee pension 
benefit plan which requires or permits-
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the 
cessation of an employee's benefit accrual, or the 
reduction of the rate of an employee's benefit ac-
crual, because of age, or 
(B) in the case of a defined contribution plan, 
the cessation of allocations to an employee's ac-
count, or the reduction of the rate at which 
amounts are allocated to an employee's account, 
because of age. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization from observing any provision of an em-
ployee pension benefit plan to the extent that such 
provision imposes (without regard to age) a limitation 
on the amount of benefits that the plan provides or a 
limitation on the number of years of service or years 
of participation which are taken into account for pur-
poses of determining benefit accrual under the plan. 
(3) In the case of any employee who, as of the end of 
any plan year under a defined benefit plan, has at-
tained normal retirement age under such plan-
(A) if distribution of benefits under such plan 
with respect to such employee has commenced as 
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of the end of such plan year, then any require-
ment of this subsection for continued accrual of 
benefits under such plan with respect to such 
employee during such plan year shall be treated 
as satisfied to the extent of the actuarial equiva-
lent of in-service distribution of benefits, and 
(B) if distribution of benefits under such plan 
with respect to such employee has not com-
menced as of the end of such year in accordance 
with section 1056(a)(3) of this title and section 
401(a)(14)(C) of Title 26, and the payment of ben-
efits under such plan with respect to such em-
ployee is not suspended during such plan year 
pursuant to section 1053(a)(3)(B) of this title or 
section 411(a)(3)(B) of Title 26, then any require-
ment of this subsection for continued accrual of 
benefits under such plan with respect to such 
employee during such plan year shall be treated 
as satisfied to the extent of any adjustment in the 
benefit payable under the plan during such plan 
year attributable to the delay in the distribution 
of benefits after the attainment of normal re-
tirement age. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply in ac-
cordance with regulations of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Such regulations shall provide for the ap-
plication of the preceding provisions of this paragraph 
to all employee pension benefit plans subject to this 
subsection and may provide for the application of 
such provisions, in the case of any such employee, 
with respect to any period of time within a plan year. 
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(4) Compliance with the requirements of this sub-
section with respect to an employee pension benefit 
plan shall constitute compliance with the require-
ments of this section relating to benefit accrual under 
such plan. 
(5) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to 
any employee who is a highly compensated employee 
(within the meaning of section 414(q) of Title 26) to 
the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of precluding 
discrimination in favor of highly compensated em-
ployees within the meaning of subchapter D of chap-
ter 1 ofTitle 26. 
(6) A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the sub-
sidized portion of any early retirement benefit is dis-
regarded in determining benefit accruals or it is a 
plan permitted by subsection (m) of this section .. 1 
(7) Any regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury pursuant to clause (v) of section 411(b)(l)(H) 
of Title 26 and subparagraphs (C) and (D) of sec-
tion 411(b)(2) of Title 26 shall apply with respect to 
the requirements of this subsection in the same 
manner and to the same extent as such regulations 
apply with respect to the requirements of such see-
tions 411(b)(1)(H) and 411(b)(2). 
1 So in original. 
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(8) A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of this section solely because such plan 
provides a normal retirement age described in section 
1002(24)(B) of this title and section 411(a)(8)(B) of 
Title 26. 
(9) For purposes of this subsection-
(A) The terms "employee pension benefit plan", 
"defined benefit plan", "defined contribution 
plan", and "normal retirement age" have the 
meanings provided such terms in section 1002 of 
this title. 
(B) The term "compensation" has the meaning 
provided by section 414(s) of Title 26. 
(10) Special rules relating to age 
(A) Comparison to similarly situated younger 
individual 
(i) In general 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet 
the requirements of paragraph (1) if a partic-
ipant's accrued benefit, as determined as of 
any date under the terms of the plan, would 
be equal to or greater than that of any simi-
larly situated, younger individual who is or 
could be a participant. 
(ii) Similarly situated 
For purposes of this subparagraph, a partici-
pant is similarly situated to any other indi-
vidual if such participant is identical to such 
other individual in every respect (including 
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period of service, compensation, position, 
date of hire, work history, and any other re-
spect) except for age. 
(iii) Disregard of subsidized early retire-
ment benefits 
In determining the accrued benefit as of any 
date for purposes of this clause, the subsi-
dized portion of any early retirement benefit 
or retirement-type subsidy shall be disre-
garded. 
(iv) Accrued benefit 
For purposes of this subparagraph, the ac-
crued benefit may, under the terms of the 
plan, be expressed as an annuity payable at 
normal retirement age, the balance of a hy-
pothetical account, or the current value of 
the accumulated percentage of the employ-
ee's final average compensation. 
(B) Applicable defined benefit plans 
(i) Interest credits 
(I) In general 
An applicable defined benefit plan shall 
be treated as failing to meet the re-
quirements of paragraph (1) unless the 
terms of the plan provide that any inter-
est credit (or an equivalent amount) for 
any plan year shall be at a rate which is 
not greater than a market rate of return. 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to 
meet the requirements of this subclause 
merely because the plan provides for a 
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reasonable minimum guaranteed rate of 
return or for a rate of return that is 
equal to the greater of a fixed or variable 
rate of return. 
(II) Preservation of capital 
An interest credit (or an equivalent 
amount) of less than zero shall in no 
event result in the account balance or 
similar amount being less than the ag-
gregate amount of contributions credited 
to the account. 
(III) Market rate of return 
The Secretary of the Treasury may pro-
vide by regulation for rules governing 
the calculation of a market rate of return 
for purposes of subclause (I) and for 
permissible methods of crediting interest 
to the account (including fixed or varia-
ble interest rates) resulting in effective 
rates of return meeting the require-
ments of subclause (I). In the case of a 
governmental plan (as defined in the 
first sentence of section 414(d) of Title 
26, a rate of return or a method of credit-
ing interest established pursuant to any 
provision of Federal, State, or local law 
(including any administrative rule or 
policy adopted in accordance with any 
such law) shall be treated as a market 
rate of return for purposes of subclause 
(I) and a permissible method of crediting 
interest for purposes of meeting the re-
quirements of subclause (I), except that 
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this sentence shall only apply to a rate of 
return or method of crediting interest if 
such rate or method does not violate any 
other requirement of this chapter. 
(ii) Special rule for plan conversions 
If, after June 29, 2005, an applicable plan 
amendment is adopted, the plan shall be 
treated as failing to meet the requirements 
of paragraph (l)(H) unless the requirements 
of clause (iii) are met with respect to each 
individual who was a participant in the plan 
immediately before the adoption of the 
amendment. 
(iii) Rate of benefit accrual 
Subject to clause (iv), the requirements of 
this clause are met with respect to any par-
ticipant if the accrued benefit of the partici-
pant under the terms of the plan as in effect 
after the amendment is not less than the 
sum of-
(I) the participant's accrued benefit for 
years of service before the effective date 
of the amendment, determined under 
the terms of the plan as in effect before 
the amendment, plus 
(II) the participant's accrued benefit 
for years of service after the effective 
date of the amendment, determined un-
der the terms of the plan as in effect af-
ter the amendment. 
104a 
(iv) Special rules for early retirement sub-
sidies 
For purposes of clause (iii)(I), the plan shall 
credit the accumulation account or similar 
amount with the amount of any early re-
tirement benefit or retirement-type subsidy 
for the plan year in which the participant re-
tires if, as of such time, the participant has 
met the age, years of service, and other re-
quirements under the plan for entitlement to 
such benefit or subsidy. 
(v) Applicable plan amendment 
For purposes of this subparagraph -
(I) In general 
The term "applicable plan amendment" 
means an amendment to a defined bene-
fit plan which has the effect of convert-
ing the plan to an applicable defined 
benefit plan. 
(II) Special rule for coordinated bene-
fits 
If the benefits of 2 or more defined bene-
fit plans established or_ maintained by 
an employer are coordinated in such a 
manner as to have the effect of the adop-
tion of an amendment described in sub-
clause (I), the sponsor of the defined 
benefit plan or plans providing for such 
coordination shall be treated as having 
adopted such a plan amendment as of 
the date such coordination begins. 
105a 
(III) Multiple amendments 
The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue 
regulations to prevent the avoidance of 
the purposes of this subparagraph through 
the use of 2 or more plan amendments 
rather than a single amendment. 
(IV) Applicable defined benefit plan 
For purposes of this subparagraph, the 
term "applicable defined benefit plan" 
has the meaning given such term by sec-
tion 1053(f)(3) of this title. 
(vi) Termination requirements 
An applicable defined benefit plan shall not 
be treated as meeting the requirements of 
clause (i) unless the plan provides that, upon 
the termination of the plan -
(I) if the interest credit rate (or an 
equivalent amount) under the plan is a 
variable rate, the rate of interest used to 
determine accrued benefits under the 
plan shall be equal to the average of the 
rates of interest used under the plan 
during the 5-year period ending on the 
termination date, and 
(II) the interest rate and mortality ta-
ble used to determine the amount of any 
benefit under the plan payable in the 
form of an annuity payable at normal re-
tirement age shall be the rate and table 
specified under the plan for such pur-
pose as of the termination date, except 
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that if such interest rate is a variable 
rate, the interest rate shall be deter-
mined under the rules of subclause (I). 
(C) Certain offsets permitted 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of paragraph ( 1) solely because the 
plan provides offsets against benefits under the 
plan to the extent such offsets are allowable 
in applying the requirements of section 401(a) of 
Title 26. 
(D) Permitted disparities in plan contributions 
or benefits 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the 
plan provides a disparity in contributions or ben-
efits with respect to which the requirements of 
section 401(1) of Title 26 are met. 
(E) Indexing permitted 
(i) In general 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet 
the requirements of paragraph (1) solely be-
cause the plan provides for indexing of ac-
crued benefits under the plan. 
(ii) Protection against loss 
Except in the case of any benefit provided in 
the form of a variable annuity, clause (i) shall 
not apply with respect to any indexing which 
results in an accrued benefit less than the 




For purposes of this subparagraph, the term 
"indexing'' means, in connection with an ac-
crued benefit, the periodic adjustment of the 
accrued benefit by means of the application 
of a recognized investment index or method-
ology. 
(F) Early retirement benefit or retirement-type 
subsidy 
For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "early 
retirement benefit" and "retirement-type subsi-
dy" have the meaning given such terms in section 
1053(g)(2)(A) ofthis title. 
(G) Benefit accrued to date 
For purposes of this paragraph, any reference to 
the accrued benefit shall be a reference to such 
benefit accrued to date. 
(j) Employment as firefighter or law enforcement 
officer 
It shall not be unlawful for an employer which is a 
State, a political subdivision of a State, an agency or 
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of 
a State, or an interstate agency to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual because of such 
individual's age if such action is taken -
(1) with respect to the employment of an in-
dividual as a firefighter or as a law enforcement 
officer, the employer has complied with sec-
tion 3(d)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Amendments of 1996 if the individual 
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was discharged after the date described in such 
section, and the individual has attained-
(A) the age of hiring or retirement, respec-
tively, in effect under applicable State or lo-
cal law on March 3, 1983; or 
(B)(i) if the individual was not hired, the 
age of hiring in effect on the date of such 
failure or refusal to hire under applicable 
State or local law enacted after September 
30, 1996;or 
(ii) if applicable State or local law was en-
acted after September 30, 1996, and the in-
dividual was discharged, the higher of-
(I) the age of retirement in effect on 
the date of such discharge under such 
law; and 
(II) age 55; and 
(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement 
plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the pur-
poses of this chapter. 
(k) Seniority system or employee benefit plan; com-
pliance 
A seniority system or employee benefit plan shall 
comply with this chapter regardless of the date of 
adoption of such system or plan. 
(l) Lawful practices; minimum age as condition of 
eligibility for retirement benefits; deductions from 
severance pay; reduction of long-term disability ben-
efits 
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Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (f)(2)(B) 
of this section -
(l)(A) It shall not be a violation of subsection 
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because-
(i) an employee pension benefit plan (as de-
fined in section 1002(2) of this title) provides 
for the attainment of a minimum age as a 
condition of eligibility for normal or early re-
tirement benefits; or 
(ii) a defined benefit plan (as defined in 
section 1002(35) of this title) provides for-
(I) payments that constitute the subsi-
dized portion of an early retirement ben-
efit; or 
(II) social security supplements for 
plan participants that commence before 
the age and terminate at the age (speci-
fied by the plan) when participants are 
eligible to receive reduced or unreduced 
old-age insurance benefits under title II 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 
et seq.), and that do not exceed such old-
age insurance benefits. 
(B) A voluntary early retirement incentive plan 
that-
(i) is maintained by -
(I) a local educational agency (as de-
fined in section 7801 ofTitle 20, or 
(II) an education association which 
principally represents employees of 1 
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or more agencies described in subclause 
(I) and which is described in section 
501(c)(5) or (6) of Title 26 and exempt 
from taxation under section 501(a) of 
Title 26, and 
(ii) makes payments or supplements de-
scribed in subclauses (I) and (II) of subpara-
graph (A)(ii) in coordination with a defined 
benefit plan (as so defined) maintained by 
an eligible employer described in section 
457(e)(l)(A) of Title 26 or by an education as-
sociation described in clause (i)(II), 
shall be treated solely for purposes of sub-
paragraph (A)(ii) as if it were a part of the 
defined benefit plan with respect to such 
payments or supplements. Payments or sup-
plements under such a voluntary early re-
tirement incentive plan shall not constitute 
severance pay for purposes of paragraph (2). 
(2)(A) It shall not be a violation of subsection 
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because fol-
lowing a contingent event unrelated to age-
(i) the value of any retiree health benefits 
received by an individual eligible for an im-
mediate pension; 
(ii) the value of any additional pension 
benefits that are made available solely as a 
result of the contingent event unrelated to 
age and following which the individual is eli-
gible for not less than an immediate and un-
reduced pension; or 
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(iii) the values described in both clauses (i) 
and (ii); 
are deducted from severance pay made avail-
able as a result of the contingent event unre-
lated to age. 
(B) For an individual who receives immediate 
pension benefits that are actuarially reduced un-
der subparagraph (A)(i), the amount of the de-
duction available pursuant to subparagraph 
(A)(i) shall be reduced by the same percentage as 
the reduction in the pension benefits. 
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, severance 
pay shall include that portion of supplemental 
unemployment compensation benefits (as de-
scribed in section 501(c)(17) of Title 26) that-
(i) constitutes additional benefits of up to 
52 weeks; 
(ii) has the primary purpose and effect of 
continuing benefits until an individual be-
comes eligible for an immediate and unre-
duced pension; and 
(iii) is discontinued once the individual be-
comes eligible for an immediate and unre-
duced pension. 
(D) For purposes of this paragraph and solely 
in order to make the deduction authorized under 
this paragraph, the term "retiree health benefits" 
means benefits provided pursuant to a group 
health plan covering retirees, for which (deter-
mined as of the contingent event unrelated to 
age)-
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(i) the package of benefits provided by the 
employer for the retirees who are below age 
65 is at least comparable to benefits provided 
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.); 
(ii) the package of benefits provided by the 
employer for the retirees who are age 65 and 
above is at least comparable to that offered 
under a plan that provides a benefit package 
with one-fourth the value of benefits pro-
vided under title XVIII of such Act; or 
(iii) the package of benefits provided by the 
employer is as described in clauses (i) and 
(ii). 
(E)(i) If the obligation of the employer to pro-
vide retiree health benefits is of limited duration, 
the value for each individual shall be calculated 
at a rate of $3,000 per year for benefit years be-
fore age 65, and $750 per year for benefit years 
beginning at age 65 and above. 
(ii) If the obligation of the employer to pro-
vide retiree health benefits is of unlimited 
duration, the value for each individual shall 
be calculated at a rate of $48,000 for individ-
uals below age 65, and $24,000 for individ-
uals age 65 and above. 
-(iii) The values described in clauses (i) and 
(ii) shall be calculated based on the age of 
the individual as of the date of the contin-
gent event unrelated to age. The values are 
effective on October 16, 1990, and shall be 
adjusted on an annual basis, with respect to 
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a contingent event that occurs subsequent to 
the first year after October 16, 1990, based 
on the medical component of the Consumer 
Price Index for all-urban consumers pub-
lished by the Department of Labor. 
(iv) If an individual is required to pay 
a premium for retiree health benefits, the 
value calculated pursuant to this subpara-
graph shall be reduced by whatever percent-
age of the overall premium the individual is 
required to pay. 
(F) If an employer that has implemented a de-
duction pursuant to subparagraph (A) fails to ful-
fill the obligation described in subparagraph (E), 
any aggrieved individual may bring an action for 
specific performance of the obligation described 
in subparagraph (E). The relief shall be in ad-
dition to any other remedies provided under Fed-
eral or State law. 
(3) It shall not be a violation of subsection (a), 
(b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because an 
employer provides a bona fide employee benefit 
plan or plans under which long-term disability 
benefits received by an individual are reduced by 
any pension benefits (other than those attributa-
ble to employee contributions)-
(A) paid to the individual that the individ-
ual voluntarily elects to receive; or 
(B) for which an individual who has at-
tained the later of age 62 or normal retire-
ment age is eligible. 
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(m) Voluntary retirement incentive plans 
Notwithstanding subsection (f)(2)(b) of this section, it 
shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) 
of this section solely because a plan of an institution 
of higher education (as defined in section 1001 of Title 
20) offers employees who are serving under a contract 
of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement provid-
ing for unlimited tenure) supplemental benefits upon 
voluntary retirement that are reduced or eliminated 
on the basis of age, if-
(1) such institution does not implement with 
respect to such employees any age-based reduc-
tion or cessation of benefits that are not such 
supplemental benefits, except as permitted by 
other provisions of this chapter; 
(2) such supplemental benefits are in addition 
to any retirement or severance benefits which 
have been offered generally to employees serv-
ing under a contract of unlimited tenure (or simi-
lar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure), 
independent of any early retirement or exit-
incentive plan, within the preceding 365 days; 
and 
(3) any employee who attains the minimum age 
and satisfies all non-age-based conditions for re-
ceiving a benefit under the plan has an oppor-
tunity lasting not less than 180 days to elect to 
retire and to receive the maximum benefit that 
could then be elected by a younger but otherwise 
similarly situated employee, and the plan does 
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not require retirement to occur sooner than 180 
days after such election. 
29 U.S.C.A. § 626. Recordkeeping, 
investigation, and enforcement 
(a) Attendance of witnesses; investigations, inspec-
tions, records, and homework regulations 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
shall have the power to make investigations and re-
quire the keeping of records necessary or appropriate 
for the administration of this chapter in accordance 
with the powers and procedures provided in sections 
209 and 211 of this title. 
(b) Enforcement; prohibition of age discrimination 
under fair labor standards; unpaid minimum wages 
and unpaid overtime compensation; liquidated dam-
ages; judicial relief; conciliation, conference, and per-
suasiOn 
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in ac..: 
cordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures 
provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection 
(a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of 
this section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of 
this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act under 
section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a person as 
a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed 
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime 
compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of 
this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be 
payable only in cases of willful violations of this 
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chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter 
the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal 
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectu-
ate the purposes of this chapter, including without 
limitation judgments compelling employment, rein-
statement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for 
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or 
unpaid overtime compensation under this section. 
Before instituting any action under this section, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall 
attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or 
practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance 
with the requirements of this chapter through infor-
mal methods of conciliation, conference, and persua-
sion. 
(c) Civil actions; persons aggrieved; jurisdiction; ju-
dicial relief; termination of individual action upon 
commencement of action by Commission; jury trial 
(1) Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action 
in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal 
or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of 
this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person 
to bring such action shall terminate upon the com-
mencement of an action by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such 
employee under this chapter. 
(2) In an action brought under paragraph (1), a per-
son shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of 
fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing 
as a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of 
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whether equitable relief is sought by any party in 
such action. 
(d)(l) No civil action may be commenced by an indi-
vidual under this section until 60 days after a charge 
alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
Such a charge shall be filed -
(A) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful 
practice occurred; or 
(B) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title 
applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlaw-
ful practice occurred, or within 30 days after re-
ceipt by the individual of notice of termination of 
proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier. 
(2) Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission 
shall promptly notify all persons named in such 
charge as prospective defendants in the action and 
shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful 
practice by informal methods of conciliation, confer-
ence, and persuasion. 
(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice 
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensa-
tion in violation of this chapter, when a discrimina-
tory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, 
when a person becomes subject to a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice, or when a 
person ·is affected by application of a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice, including 
each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
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paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a deci-
sion or other practice. 
(e) Reliance on administrative rulings; notice of 
dismissal or termination; civil action after receipt of 
notice 
Section 259 of this title shall apply to actions under 
this chapter. If a charge filed with the Commission 
under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings 
of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the 
Commission, the Commission shall notify the person 
aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this 
section by a person defined in section 630(a) of this 
title against the respondent named in the charge 
within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such 
notice. 
(f) Waiver 
(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim 
under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and 
voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a 
waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary 
unless at a minimum -
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between 
the individual and the employer that is written 
in a manner calculated to be understood by such 
individual, or by the average individual eligible 
to participate; 
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or 
claims arising under this chapter; 
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(C) the individual does not waive rights or 
claims that may arise after the date the waiver is 
executed; 
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only 
in exchange for consideration in addition to any-
thing of value to which the individual already is 
entitled; 
(E) the individual is advised in writing to con-
sult with an attorney prior to executing the 
agreement; 
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 
21 days within which to consider the agreement; 
or 
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with 
an exit incentive or other employment termina-
tion program offered to a group or class of em-
ployees, the individual is given a period of at 
least 45 days within which to consider the. 
agreement; 
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of 
at least 7 days following the execution of such 
agreement, the individual may revoke the agree-
ment, and the agreement shall not become effec-
tive or enforceable until the revocation period has 
expired; 
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with 
an exit incentive or other employment termina-
tion program offered to a group or class of em-
ployees, the employer (at the commencement of 
the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs 
the individual in writing in a manner calculated 
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to be understood by the average individual eligi-
ble to participate, as to -
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals 
covered by such program, any eligibility fac-
tors for such program, and any time limits 
applicable to such program; and 
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals 
eligible or selected for the program, and the 
ages of all individuals in the same job classi-
fication or organizational unit who are not 
eligible or selected for the program. 
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or an 
action filed in court by the individual or the individu-
al's representative, alleging age discrimination of a 
kind prohibited under section 623 or 633a of this title 
may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless 
at a minimum -
(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of para-
graph (1) have been met; and 
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period 
of time within which to consider the settlement 
agreement. 
(3) In any dispute that may arise over whether any 
of the requirements, conditions, and circumstances 
set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), 
(G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or 
(B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party assert-
ing the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of 
proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a 
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waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to par-
agraph (1) or (2). 
(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commis-
sion's rights and responsibilities to enforce this chap-
ter. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with 
the protected right of an employee to file a charge 
or participate in an investigation or proceeding con-
ducted by the Commission. 
29 U.S.C. § 631. Age limits 
(a) Individuals at least 40 years of age 
The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to in-
dividuals who are at least 40 years of age. 
(b) Employees or applicants for employment in Fed-
eral Government 
In the case of any personnel action affecting employ-
ees or applicants for employment which is subject to 
the provisions of section 633a of this title, the prohi-
bitions established in section 633a of this title shall 
be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of 
age. 
(c) Bona fide executives or high policymakers 
(I) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who 
has attained 65 years of age and who, for the 2-year 
period immediately before retirement, is employed 
in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking po-
sition, if such employee is entitled to an immediate 
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nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pen-
sion, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensa-
tion plan, or any combination of such plans, of the 
employer of such employee, which equals, in the ag-
gregate, at least $44,000. 
(2) In applying the retirement benefit test of para-
graph (1) of this subsection, if any such retire-
ment benefit is in a form other than a straight life 
annuity (with no ancillary benefits), or if employees 
contribute to any such plan or make rollover contri-
butions, such benefit shall be adjusted in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, after consultation 
with the Secretary of the Treasury, so that the benefit 
is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no 
ancillary benefits) under a plan to which employees 
do not contribute and under which no rollover contri-




Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immun-
ities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
